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I. INTRODUCTION 
Waive (vb.): [T]o abandon, renounce, or surrender (a 
claim, privilege, right, etc.); to give up (a right or claim) 
voluntarily.1 
Can a defendant waive his right to appeal a death sentence? 
Can a criminal suspect waive constitutional protections? Can an 
individual waive, via contract, his right of freedom of association 
or freedom of speech? Can a patient waive her right to informed 
consent? How do we establish what rights can be waived? Of 
those rights that can be waived, which actions, or decisions, 
should be considered valid waivers of the right in question? 
Waiver is a prominent concept in law and appears most 
recognizably in criminal procedural law.2 But it also has 
                                                          
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1580 (7th ed. 1999). I will use the generic term “right” 
to refer to rights, claims, and entitlements. Resolution of debates about the correct 
application of the term are not necessary for the argument proposed here and are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
 2. See, e.g., George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful 
Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977) (arguing that the doctrine of waiver must function to 
ensure finality of convictions when such convictions are based on waiver of procedural 
rights); David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 74 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 941 (1997) (discussing the rationale, standards, and constitutional scope of waiver 
as a right in criminal procedure); Nancy Jean King, Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable 
Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113 (1999) (discussing agreements 
between prosecutors and criminal defendants that waive certain of the defendants’ 
constitutional protections, and arguing that the interests of third parties and the general 
public may justify restrictions on these agreements); Ralph S. Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, 
Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978) (examining how 
decisions by the Burger Court affect a criminal defendant’s ability to guard against the 
loss of rights, including rights lost by waiver); Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A 
Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. 
REV. 1214 (1977) (discussing “the relationship between the concept of forfeiture and 
the . . . notion of waiver”); Kenneth A. Goldman, Comment, Criminal Waiver: The 
Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 
CAL. L. REV. 1262 (1966) (analyzing those factors that affect the binding nature of a 
purported waiver, specifically as applied to the acts of the counsel, the defendant, and the 
court). But see Richard C. Ausness, “Waive” Goodbye to Tort Liability: A Proposal to 
Remove Paternalism from Product Sales Transactions, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 293 (2000) 
(arguing that waivers of tort liability should be permitted in the products liability 
context); Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511 
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applications in insurance law,3 labor and employment law,4 
mediation,5 property law,6 civil procedure,7 contract law,8 tort law,9 
and fiduciary relationships.10 There are different requirements for 
waivers of tort liability, statutory rights, criminal procedural rights, 
and contractual conditions. Moreover, the term “waiver” is used to 
refer to a variety of actions. For purposes of this Article, it includes 
any action or decision by an individual11 to give up a right that is 
currently functioning (for example, constitutional protections in the 
Bill of Rights),12 as well as contractual agreements to give up future 
rights or entitlements. 
                                                          
(1997) (discussing waiver in the context of informed consent to medical treatment and 
research); Fleming James, Jr., Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952) (discussing 
the waiver of the right to bring a negligence action according to the concept of assumption 
of the risk); Richard L. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. 
L. REV. 1605 (1986) (advocating a framework for waiver decisions in civil litigation); Fred 
C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407 (1998) (critiquing the rules 
that govern client waiver of attorney conflicts of interest); Elysa Gordon, Note, 
Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The Notion of Informed Waiver, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1321 (1996) (proposing a doctrine of “informed waiver” in medical 
decisionmaking to accommodate patients holding non-Western beliefs); Developments in 
the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1629 (1985) [hereinafter 
Developments in the Law] (discussing the function of implied waiver in privilege law). 
 3. See, e.g., 2 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:36, at 22-79 to 22-80 (3d ed. 
1995); 13 id. § 194:21, at 194–29. 
 4. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion and the 
Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection 
Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1294–98 (1993) (explaining how age-based exit incentives lead 
older workers to waive their rights under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); 
William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have 
to? Do You Really Want to?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 269–73 (1994) (discussing waiver of 
statutory rights in employment contracts). 
 5. See, e.g., 10A N.C. INDEX 4th, Divorced Separation § 527 (2002) (indicating that 
North Carolina law allows the waiver of mandatory custody or visitation matters for 
mediation, subject to a showing of good cause). 
 6. See, e.g., 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homestead § 187 (1999) (describing scenarios under 
property law in which homestead rights may be waived); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, 
Waiver of Right to Enforce Restrictive Covenant by Failure to Object to Other Violations, 
25 A.L.R. 5th 123 (1994) (discussing various ways in which restrictive covenants on land 
use may be waived). 
 7. See, e.g., 61A AM. JUR. 2D Pleading §§ 329, 395 (2002). 
 8. See, e.g., David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: 
Public and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 607, 609, 624–26. 
 9. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 2, at 294 (recognizing that waiver is permitted 
“under principles of negligence and warranty law”). 
 10. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 821–22 (1983) 
[hereinafter Frankel, Fiduciary Law] (explaining that parties cannot waive a court’s 
supervision over a fiduciary relation). 
 11. Waiver, in this sense, is a unilateral act. See Snyder, supra note 8, at 626–27 
(distinguishing waivers from modifications, which are agreements). 
 12. Dix, supra note 2, at 205 (“[W]aiver should be defined as . . . a conscious choice 
made by a person whose right is at issue.”). Compare this with the doctrine of forfeiture. 
Refer to notes 104–07 infra and accompanying text. 
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Part II of this Article argues that the concept of autonomy can 
be developed into a framework that will provide a more precise way 
of understanding waivers. Part III develops the conceptual 
framework in more detail, identifying the elements necessary for a 
valid waiver in specific circumstances. This Article stresses that the 
determination of whether, and how, a right can be waived depends 
on the nature of the right in question13 and its implications for 
individual autonomy. The final part of the Article considers the 
application of the framework in different contexts. The goal is not to 
provide a detailed analysis of all possible legal waivers—production 
of such a tome is beyond the scope of this Article—but rather to 
suggest a unifying framework under which to analyze waivers. 
Although examples are drawn from numerous areas of law, this 
Article will leave the detailed application of the framework to 
experts in the relative legal subspecialties. 
The academic literature contains numerous discussions of 
waiver, almost all of which have been limited to a specific area of 
law.14 None has provided an overarching theory satisfactorily 
explaining why courts have set different standards for achieving a 
valid waiver in different legal contexts.15 Although such meta-
                                                          
 13. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (explaining that what suffices 
for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue). “[W]hether certain procedures are 
required . . . and whether the . . . choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend 
on the right at stake.” Id. 
 14. Refer to notes 2–10 supra and accompanying text. This Article draws from each of 
these theories, as well as to parallels that can be drawn to discussions of the inalienability of 
particular rights. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 
YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1983) (discussing waiver in terms of inalienability). For an excellent 
general summary of the inalienability debate, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1477–89 (1989). Professor Sullivan identifies four theories 
that support inalienability: paternalism, efficiency, distribution, and personhood. Id. at 1477, 
1479–86. Paternalism concerns function in the waiver context as well because a 
nonautonomous waiver should not be considered valid. See id. at 1480–81. Moreover, 
personhood concerns are analogous to the concept of ascriptive autonomy. Efficiency concerns 
come into play under the headings of system issues and some across-the-board limitations of 
waivers of descriptive autonomy. Distribution concerns are also dealt with under descriptive 
autonomy. 
 15. Thus far there has been only one attempt at a comprehensive theory of waiver. See 
Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478 (1981). Edward 
Rubin proposes that “rights . . . are structuring devices; they can be relinquished only if 
acceptable alternative means of structuring the relationship are employed.” Id. at 537. 
According to Rubin, valid waivers “require that parties who waive a particular right obtain the 
functional equivalent of that right in the context of their more informal interaction.” Id. Rubin 
uses the example of adjudication rights to demonstrate the implications of his theory and 
suggests that, because their purpose is to assure due process protection, the waiver in question 
should likewise achieve the functional due process equivalent. Id. at 537–39. This translates 
into requirements that waivers reach the type of result that a court could have reached. 
Moreover, Rubin states that the waiver must afford the functional equivalent of notice and a 
hearing, and that the parties must know the right is being waived and they must negotiate the 
waiver. Id. at 539. One problem with Rubin’s theory is his apparent contradiction in 
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theories have their limitations, proposal of a general framework for 
analyzing waiver should help better clarify what standards should 
be applied to waivers and what waivers should be allowed. In 
addition, providing a common language to analyze waiver issues 
will help avoid compartmentalization of law. It will enable both 
similar treatment of similar issues and a better understanding of 
distinctions made between dissimilar issues. 
Of the specific theories of waiver that have been suggested, 
many rely on efficiency or other law and economics rationales for 
evaluating waivers.16 While my work does not come out of this 
tradition, my approach is not uncongenial to the general law and 
economics approach. First, as will be seen, my approach hinges on 
an analytical method designed to maximize individual autonomy, 
and law and economics is, above all, a methodology for maximizing 
values. Second, I do not believe that the autonomy value that sits at 
the center of this analytical framework is far removed from the 
                                                          
acknowledging that the advantage to many alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is their 
potential to reach results that are novel, see id. at 488–89, and his requirement that the 
process substituted by the waiver achieve a result that a court could have reached if it had 
adjudicated the matter, see id. at 480, 536–40. Nonetheless, Rubin’s theory is attractive. It 
provides a conceptual framework that, in theory, applies across different waiver contexts. But 
although I agree with his definition of rights as a “means of regulating relationships between 
individuals or between individuals and the state,” and also that “[t]o incorporate this view of 
rights, a theory of waiver should take account of the entire situation in which the waiver 
occurs,” see id. at 529, I do not believe that this is the end of the analysis. Rubin’s theory 
focuses too much on the process protections that rights serve, and not enough on the 
substantive analysis of the nature of the right itself. So, although he acknowledges that in each 
case one must determine the “nature of the right that has been waived” and “the kind of 
protection that the right provides,” id. at 537, his theory is most well-developed in the context 
of criminal procedural rights around adjudication, and fails to explain adequately why there 
are other rights that can or cannot be waived and the standards that should adhere to these 
waivers. In particular, he labels civil law rights unrelated to adjudication “amorphous” and 
notes that there is “no single policy that governs the substantive rules that affect private 
agreements.” Id. at 540. In contrast, this Article argues that autonomy functions as a guiding 
overarching principle for both criminal and civil law. 
 16. Ausness, supra note 2, at 298, 301–04 (arguing that waivers of strict liability for 
products should be allowed because they promote economic efficiency); Dix, supra note 2, at 
216–19 (listing the interests that must be accommodated by a theory of waiver); Kaplan & 
Dixon, supra note 2, at 953–54 (examining how standards in criminal procedure differ based on 
the system’s needs to promote truth-seeking); King, supra note 2, at 117 (arguing that criminal 
litigation waivers outside of plea bargains should only be restricted if there are public or third-
party interests which override the litigants interests); Kronman, supra note 14, at 766–74 
(positing that contract limitations on waiver are based on, among other things, economic 
efficiency concerns); Spritzer, supra note 2, at 481, 488 (discussing how, in criminal procedure, 
the standard for not applying strict safeguards around waivers is whether such safeguards 
would be impracticable); Westen, supra note 2, at 1261 (concluding that waiver is part “of the 
broader principle of forfeiture” and depends on the interests of the state); Zacharias, supra note 
2, at 420 (positing that conflicts of interest rules for professionals may be unwaivable to ensure 
that the adversary system functions appropriately); Todd J. Zywicki, Mend It, Don’t End It: 
The Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for Debtor in Possession’s 
Professionals, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 291, 308 (1998) (discussing that conflicts of interest rules in 
bankruptcy may be nonwaivable because of public interest). 
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kinds of values promoted by efficiency analyses, which are based on 
respect for the preferences of individuals.17 But whereas efficiency (or 
other) concerns should play a role, they alone are not determinative 
because they fail adequately to explain why there are different 
standards for waiver in different circumstances.18 
This Article argues that autonomy19 is a better basis for 
understanding waivers of individual rights.20 Autonomy is the basic 
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., Bailey H. Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the 
Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893 (1990) (examining the link between autonomy and economic 
theory). Libertarianism stresses the link between law and economics and autonomy. But cf. G. 
Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431 (1993) (arguing that the 
modern Court relies primarily on notions of efficiency, while the Lochner Court emphasized 
autonomy). Professor Shell advocates a combined approach incorporating efficiency concerns, along 
with “sensitivities to context and an appreciation of the limits of markets in allocating important 
human and economic rights.” Id. at 518. Labeled “Pragmatic Contract Theory,” it is a mixture of 
neoclassical theory and libertarian views. Id. at 518–19. 
 18. Shell, supra note 17, at 515–16 (noting an economic efficiency approach to contracts 
“provides no principled basis for distinguishing between alienable and inalienable rights”). 
 19. Although respect for the value of autonomy is widely espoused by liberal theory, it has 
multiple meanings and practical implications. See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, 
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120–21 (4th ed. 1994); THOMAS MAY, AUTONOMY, AUTHORITY 
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 35 (1998). The term “autonomy” translates literally as “self-rule,” but 
such a simplistic definition does little to identify a concrete goal towards which to work in shaping 
our societal system of individual rights. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra, at 120–21. Professor 
Rogers Smith argues that initial conceptions of autonomy, both legal and philosophical, appeared to 
focus on liberty. Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 176–78 
(1982) [hereinafter Smith, Constitution and Autonomy]. The Framers of the Constitution were 
concerned with creating a liberal democratic state that allowed individuals freedom from 
government interference such that they could pursue certain objectives defined by reason. Id. 
Autonomy, in this sense, functions as a means to achieve a certain end—rational decisionmaking—
and thus, the concept itself is shaped or limited by the goal—rationality. See id. at 178. If people are 
rational beings in Kantian terms, then they should “want” to maximize rationality, because this is a 
rational position. Id. at 195. In other words, Kant’s conception of autonomy was necessarily limited 
by rationality because an irrational person or act was by definition not autonomous. See id. at 195–
96. Rationality, under this theory, is an independently established notion. People do not agree or 
disagree as to its content. Dan Brock discusses this problem in his critique of rights-based limitations 
on paternalism. Dan Brock, Paternalism and Promoting the Good, in PATERNALISM 248 (Rolf 
Satorius ed., 1983). He stresses that a rational person should welcome interference with decisions 
when the interference will result in better promoting the individual’s good. Id. Norman Dahl rebuts 
Brock’s assertion and argues that Brock needs to consider an expanded notion of rationality. 
Norman O. Dahl, Paternalism and Rational Desire, in PATERNALISM, supra, at 261. According to 
Dahl, if it is rational to act on one’s own choices, and this position can be universalized, under 
Kantian theory, then it is irrational to interfere with an individual acting on his choices, even if to do 
so would be beneficial because that position could not be universalized. Id. at 267–68. Thus, there are 
rational rights-based limitations on paternalistic action. Id. at 267. 
  Professor Smith argues that the initial conception of the Framers is no longer valid, and 
he advocates instead that autonomy must be thought of in broader terms as freedom to develop 
individual intellect and emotion. Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra, at 184 (citing Justice 
Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927)). This view of autonomy is a particularly Western, or American, view. JESSICA W. BERG ET 
AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 14–15 (2d ed. 2001). For a view 
that this Western concept of autonomy presents difficulty for patients with non-Western beliefs, see 
Gordon, supra note 2. 
 20. This Article distinguishes between waivers that relate to individual autonomy and those 
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value underlying liberal society.21 In liberal theory, 
maximizing autonomy is the ultimate goal and governmental 
interference is appropriate only to the extent that it facilitates 
this goal.22 A focus on facilitating autonomy above all else 
represents the extreme position: minimum limitations on 
individual rights of decisionmaking and maximum restrictions 
on societal (governmental) interference. Other theories, such 
as those that promote beneficence or communitarian goals, 
provide different reasons to restrict individual waiver 
decisions;23 but only autonomy both provides an appropriate 
baseline from which to work and reflects factors that the 
courts and legislatures actually consider in analyzing 
waivers.24 Although other rationales may help explain legal 
rules in specific contexts, a focus on maximizing autonomy 
provides a descriptively valid basis for analysis and also a 
normative framework that can be applied across different 
areas. Not only has our society already demonstrated a 
commitment to this goal,25 but there are significant 
psychological benefits for individuals under such a system.26 
                                                          
that have implications for others. Refer to notes 33–37 infra and accompanying text. 
 21. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in MILL: TEXTS COMMENTARIES 50 (Alan Ryan 
ed., 1997). For various views on autonomy and liberalism, see generally ISAIAH BERLIN, 
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969); JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1995); LIBERALISM AND 
ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). This Article will begin with the assumption that 
autonomy forms the basis for our system of laws and does so appropriately. 
 22. See Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and Psychological Perspectives, 37 
VILL. L. REV. 1705, 1712 (1992) (describing how autonomy is “a value that infuses the 
Constitution . . . [and] is a central principle of much of our ethical and political theory”). 
Winick concludes that, although there are problems with an autonomy model, the 
conception of “the individual as an autonomous decisionmaker . . . is a useful foundation 
upon which to build a legal system . . . [and] to place limitations on governmental power.” 
Id. at 1769. 
 23. This Article does not examine these other theories in detail. For example, 
acceptance of communitarian ideals may lead to additional restrictions on individual 
control over decisionmaking based on promoting community values and needs, and thus, 
additional restrictions on individual waivers in light of these goals. So, too, may 
utilitarian theory because the “greatest good for all” may be achieved by limiting 
individual rights in certain circumstances. Refer to note 29 infra (discussing 
utilitarianism). Although other theories do not necessarily result in further limitations on 
individual rights or autonomy, each has the potential to do so given its underlying goal. 
Liberal theory, by contrast, is the least restrictive of individual rights and autonomy, and 
thus, provides an appropriate baseline from which to begin an analysis of waiver. 
 24. Refer to Part II infra. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Winick stresses that there are psychological benefits of allowing people to make 
their own choices and that, because we have adopted a liberal system of government in 
the United States, “[a]utonomy . . . should be presumptively protected by our law, and 
government should bear a heavy burden of justification when it seeks to interfere with an 
individual’s choice.” Winick, supra note 22, at 1771. These benefits include avoiding 
encouraging “learned helplessness” behavior, promoting self-efficiency and responsibility, 
increasing personal satisfaction leading to better performance and motivation to succeed. 
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Moreover, there is a strong argument that commitment to 
individual autonomy is necessary to produce the best society 
overall, as well as the best use of resources within that society 
(as defined by individual wants and preferences).27 
There are two primary reasons why autonomy is valued and 
thus sought to be maximized. First, autonomy has instrumental 
value, or value as a means to achieve other goals. Professor 
Ronald Dworkin calls this the “evidentiary view”—that the 
individual is the best judge of what promotes his own welfare.28 If 
welfare is the ultimate goal, then autonomy serves an 
instrumental function in achieving that goal. However, Professor 
Dworkin advocates the “integrity view” of autonomy—that 
“[a]utonomy encourages and protects people’s general capacity to 
lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a 
sense of what is important to and for them.”29 In the evidentiary 
                                                          
Id. at 1765–68. 
 27. Professor Hayek argues this point based on the knowledge differentials between 
individuals and the lack of any centralized mechanism that can gather and disseminate 
such knowledge. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 
(1945); see also 1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 55 (1973) (“The thesis of 
this book is that a condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their knowledge for 
their purposes, restrained only by the rules of just conduct of universal application, is 
likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their aims . . . .”). 
 28. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, 
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 222–23 (1993); see also Winick, supra note 22, at 
1770 (“Because individual conceptions of happiness inevitably differ, the individual, and 
not the government, must select his or her own path . . . .”). 
 29. DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 224. These two viewpoints demonstrate 
consequentialist versus deontological rationales for promoting autonomy. 
Consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism, determine the ethical or correct course 
of action by looking at the consequences of different alternatives. The alternative that 
leads to the best result, however defined, is the ethical one. Rule-utilitarianism seeks to 
effectuate rules that will generally result in the greatest good. Act-utilitarianism, on the 
other hand, focuses on individual acts and, in each case evaluates what action will lead to 
the greatest good. Deontological theories evaluate the ethics of alternative courses of 
action based on the importance of particular values. One basic form of deontological 
reasoning is to test the justice of a particular action or practice by universalizing it: if a 
practice cannot be sustained when everyone does it, it violates our sense that moral rules 
ought to apply equally to all competent moral agents. See IMMANUEL KANT, ETHICAL 
PHILOSOPHY: THE COMPLETE TEXTS OF GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
AND METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE xi–xxii (James W. Wellington trans., 1983). 
One of the most famous deontologists is Immanuel Kant, who argued that determining 
the moral or right action in a particular circumstance depends on one’s ability to 
universalize the rule governing the act, otherwise known as the “categorical imperative.” 
Id. at xv–xvi. One formulation of his categorical imperative (sometimes referred to as a 
maxim) is to treat people as ends in themselves and not merely as means. Id. at xix. In 
other words, we must respect an individual’s capacity to determine what happens to 
himself. Id. at xix–xx. One of the major failings of Kantian ethics, and many other 
deontological theories, is the lack of guidance for dealing with conflicting maxims. 
  John Rawls’s adaptation of Kantian ethics attempts to demonstrate how a 
deontological theory can be applied to understand the social contract existing in a just 
society. He argues that valid ethical principles governing action are those to which 
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view, autonomy is valued for its positive consequences.30 In the 
integrity view, autonomy is valued in and of itself.31 Both 
rationales support maximum respect for autonomy within our 
society and thus through our laws and legal system. 
II. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WAIVER 
If waivers are autonomous actions, then most waivers should 
be allowed with little interference from the state.32 A society that 
places primary value on autonomy should not interfere with the 
individual exercise of autonomy except to the extent that such 
exercise infringes upon the autonomy of others. Using John 
Stuart Mill’s position as a baseline because he takes a fairly 
extreme view of limitations on governmental interference with 
individual freedom, we might begin to consider the justifications 
for imposing limits on autonomy. As Mill states in his famous 
essay On Liberty, “[t]he only part of the conduct of any one, for 
which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In 
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of 
right, absolute.”33 Mill distinguishes the individual realm, in 
which societal interference is impermissible, from the public 
realm, in which interference may be appropriate, and sometimes 
necessary, to assure protection of the individual realm.34 A 
government that values autonomy will necessarily be both 
limited and justified in its actions by this pronouncement—
limited to the extent that a government must not interfere with a 
person’s actions within the private realm and, at the same time, 
justified in taking actions that assure that individuals have 
                                                          
rational agents would all agree if situated behind a hypothetical “veil of ignorance,” for 
example, blind as to individual interests. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 516–18 
(1971). In this state, we might agree to a rule, or rules, promoting individual autonomy. 
 30. See DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 223 (defining the evidentiary view as respecting 
others’ decisions because they know what is best for themselves). 
 31. See id. at 224 (explaining the integrity view as “recogniz[ing] that people often 
make choices that reflect weakness, indecision, caprice, or plain irrationality” and that it 
“does not assume that competent people have consistent values or always make consistent 
choices”). 
 32. Depending on the initial theory one subscribes to, the justification for legal 
interference will vary. Under an autonomy framework, legal intervention is justified 
when the rules will result in a situation of greater autonomy overall. 
 33. Mill, supra note 21, at 48. 
 34. Id. at 48–50. There are a number of problems with this dichotomy that have 
been well analyzed by others. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, 
supra note 19, at 19–22 (questioning Mill’s objection “to paternalistic interferences with a 
person’s liberty”); Joel Feinberg, Legal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 19, at 3–
17 (arguing that state action can be justified “to protect individuals from self-inflicted 
harm”). 
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freedom to act within the private realm.35 The latter position 
implies that to protect one individual’s autonomy, the autonomy 
of another individual will sometimes be subject to state 
interference to the extent that the actions in question have 
implications beyond the individual sphere.36 This Article will not 
address limits on individual autonomous actions that have effects 
on other individuals’ autonomy because these actions may be 
limited on that basis alone.37 
It might appear that, under this framework, waivers within 
the individual realm should always be given deference.38 But 
even under Mill’s idealized notion of autonomy, this situation is 
not so—there are limits on an individual’s liberty to give up 
liberty. Thus, Mill states: 
[A]n engagement by which a person should sell himself, or 
allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and 
void . . . . [B]y selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his 
liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single 
act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose 
which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of 
                                                          
 35. These two aspects of autonomy are sometimes referred to as negative and 
positive autonomy. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
875, 875–85 (1994) (arguing that this dual conception is flawed, and suggesting an 
alternative framework). This Article addresses Professor Fallon’s arguments in more 
detail below. Negative autonomy refers to restrictions on governmental action—the right 
of individuals to non-interference within an autonomous sphere. Id. at 876, 880–81. 
Positive autonomy refers to societal promotion of autonomy—a justifying basis for 
governmental intrusion into the individual sphere to promote individual autonomy. Id. at 
876, 883–85. 
 36. Examples of state interference with individual autonomy due to effects on 
others are numerous and include: time, place, and manner constraints on freedom of 
speech; imposition of obligations with regard to marriage and children; tort law 
protections of persons and property; traffic laws; and criminal laws such as assault and 
battery. 
 37. It is, of course, difficult to draw lines between actions that affect only the 
individual in question and actions that affect others. All actions affect other individuals in 
some way—persons do not function in a vacuum. This fact is the problem (well discussed 
by others) with Mill’s notion of actions within the individual realm. But, for purposes of 
this argument, this Article will assume we can draw some distinctions between waivers of 
rights that pertain specifically to the individual and those that implicate rights of other 
persons. Limits on autonomous actions that affect others may be justified on that basis—
the effect on others. For example, in contracts, one party to a contract cannot waive a 
condition for the benefit of both parties. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 494 (3d ed. 1987). Of more interest to me (and the focus of this 
Article) are limits on individual autonomy with respect to actions that do not obviously (or 
directly) affect others. 
 38. This presumes that the waiver is itself autonomous. Consider the example of 
waivers of conflicts of interests for legal professionals. In some situations, courts reject 
individual choices because they distrust the motivations of the attorneys, and thus appear 
to question whether the individual’s waiver is fully informed and autonomous. Zacharias, 
supra note 2, at 416–17, 422. 
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himself. . . . The principle of freedom cannot require that he 
should be free not to be free.39 
In other words, promotion of autonomy requires that 
individuals relinquish the freedom or right to give up 
(permanently) autonomy itself. Mill seems to give two unrelated 
reasons for this restriction. The first is utilitarian in nature: 
slavery is per se harmful or bad, outweighing any harm from 
restricting autonomy in these situations. The second is Kantian: 
individuals have inherent sovereignty over themselves that 
cannot be given up.40 Professor Gerald Dworkin agrees that 
limitations on autonomy are permissible and that governmental 
restrictions or interference are justified “to preserve a wider 
range of freedom for the individual in question.”41 Eschewing 
Mill’s arguments, he stresses that it is often rational for 
individuals to agree ahead of time to state interference with their 
liberty, even within the so-called “individual realm.”42 
                                                          
 39. Mill, supra note 21, at 121; see also Kronman, supra note 14, at 776–80 
(suggesting that a person’s inability to enslave himself increases his self control because it 
protects the person from engaging in a contract which gives the other party the right of 
specific enforcement). Self-enslavement is problematic because an enslaved person does 
not have the option to pay damages, but instead, is held to specific performance. Id. 
 40. Professor Gerald Dworkin, in particular, notes that Mill seems to use two 
different justifications for restricting governmental interference with individual liberty. 
See Dworkin, supra note 34, at 24–28. The first justification is that interference causes 
harm (or that coercive action causes harm). Id. at 26. But this justification is an empirical 
question that would need to be answered in each case and creates no more than a 
rebuttable presumption against paternalistic action. The second justification is that state 
interference is per se wrong, regardless of the balance of harm and benefit. Id. at 27. This 
justification is certainly stronger, but cannot be reconciled with utilitarianism. 
 41. Id. at 27–28. 
 42. Id. at 29. John Rawls, one of the most prominent consent theorists, suggests 
that the state’s power to constrain individual autonomy could be based on a type of social 
contract between individuals who determine the governing rules while behind a 
hypothetical veil of ignorance, unaware of their individual position or needs. RAWLS, 
supra note 29, at 515–17. Under this concept, individuals may consent to paternalistic 
interventions “that the parties would acknowledge in the original position to protect 
themselves against the weakness and infirmities of their reason and will.” Id. at 249. 
Refer to Part II.B infra (discussing descriptive autonomy). All people wish to maximize 
their autonomy but are unable to know their needs and the personal limits that will 
restrict them from achieving their individual preferences. Therefore, they will likely 
consent to the state’s limits on individual autonomy to the extent that the limits are likely 
to promote the greatest autonomy for the most people. Although this notion of consent 
provides a theoretical justification for state restrictions on individual freedom, it is 
problematic in practice because most people do not actually consent to governmental 
interference with their lives, and some people may reject the initial constraints of Rawls’s 
original position. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 183 (relating 
democratic theorists’ belief that few citizens have ever explicitly consented to obey a 
majority decision and that tacit consent to the state should not be assumed). Nonetheless, 
it provides the most promising basis for evaluating autonomy claims. 
  Professor James Fleming develops Rawls’s theory into a practical tool to use in 
constitutional decisionmaking and argues that, in determining which rights are entitled 
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Philosopher Joel Feinberg likewise acknowledges that there may 
be limitations on autonomy, but for practical reasons—because to 
allow such action we must be certain that it was, in fact, 
voluntary and because testing voluntariness in all situations 
would be cumbersome—we presume nonvoluntariness in cases of 
significant waivers of autonomy.43 The three viewpoints represent 
the range of rationales for limiting autonomy. 
Even if we agree that slavery or other “waivers” of autonomy 
within Mill’s individual realm are impermissible, several other 
competing grounds exist, including utilitarian calculations that 
the harm in giving up autonomy is so great that it outweighs the 
harm from state interference with individual liberty;44 Kantian 
notions that there is something inherent in persons that cannot 
be given up;45 social contract or consent theories that allow 
individuals to choose a priori to give up freedom in certain 
circumstances;46 and practical concerns about determining 
voluntariness.47 Without clear guidance from one or another of 
these rationales, it may be impossible to determine the range of 
limits on freedom to waive rights and thus, on waivers of 
autonomy.48 
                                                          
to significant protection, courts should look at the link between the right and the 
deliberative quality of autonomy. James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (positing that “[c]onstitutional constructivism limits the scope of 
autonomy to protecting basic liberties that are significant preconditions for autonomy”). 
That is, only those rights that are crucial for assuring an individual’s ability to function 
within a deliberative democracy should be granted the highest protections from 
governmental interference. He identifies two aspects of deliberation—“capacity for a sense 
of justice” and “capacity for a conception of the good”—and focuses less on privacy and 
liberty than on assuring individuals the freedom to associate and interact to develop these 
two aspects. Id. at 18, 36. 
 43. Feinberg, supra note 34, at 14. 
 44. Refer to Part II.B infra (discussing descriptive autonomy). 
 45. Feinberg, supra note 34, at 13 (remarking that “there is something in every 
human being that is not his or hers to alienate or dispose of”). Refer to Part II.A infra 
(discussing ascriptive autonomy). See also Robin West, Authority Autonomy and Choice: 
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard 
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 399 (1985) (stressing that there are other values at stake 
such as human dignity and stating that “[i]t is immoral to participate in such consensual 
[but degrading] transactions and immoral for the community to tolerate them”). 
 46. Refer to Part II.B infra (discussing descriptive autonomy). 
 47. Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing system limitations). 
 48. Mill’s answer seems to be that waivers of autonomy should not be allowed, but 
are sometimes necessary for practical reasons. Mill, supra note 21, at 121 (arguing that 
although freedom should not allow a person to alienate his freedom by allowing himself to 
be enslaved, the practical “necessities of life” require that people consent to some 
limitations of their freedom). Joel Feinberg takes the opposite position, arguing that 
waivers of autonomy should be allowed in all cases except when, for practical reasons, it is 
too difficult to determine whether the waiver is itself voluntary (autonomous). Feinberg, 
supra note 34, at 15–17 (discussing employment contracts and contracts “in restraint” of 
trade as examples of agreements to abandon liberty). 
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Waivers often involve both a gain in autonomy (from the 
exercise of the autonomy through the waiver) and a loss of 
autonomy (from having sacrificed the right that is being waived). 
Accordingly, a sensible analytical approach is to compare the 
gain in autonomy from the act of waiver with the loss of 
autonomy when the right is waived and then try to maximize the 
overall autonomy. Within this framework this Article proposes 
three categories of rights that might be subject to waiver based 
on two different conceptions of autonomy.49 
The first two categories of autonomy are referred to as 
“ascriptive” and “descriptive” autonomy, respectively, borrowing 
from the terminology of Professor Richard Fallon Jr.50 Each has 
different implications for the permissibility of state interference 
with individual action.51 The third category is termed “system” 
limitations on waivers of autonomy.52 
Ascriptive autonomy is an inherent characteristic, a right of 
all competent persons. It refers to basic sovereignty over the self 
and is limited only by the inherent autonomy (and thus rights) of 
other people.53 This notion of autonomy is not quantifiable—
“people to whom autonomy is ascribed are neither more nor less 
autonomous than anyone else; all competent adult persons 
possess the right to be self-governing to the same degree.”54 
Under ascriptive autonomy, paternalistic55 interventions by the 
                                                          
 49. Refer to notes 50–60 infra and accompanying text (reviewing Richard Fallon 
Jr.’s descriptions of ascriptive and descriptive autonomy). 
 50. Fallon, supra note 35, at 876–77. 
 51. See id. at 877–78 
 52. Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing system limitations). 
 53. Fallon, supra note 35, at 890 (observing that “[a]scriptive autonomy entails 
sovereignty within a sphere bounded by the requirement of respect for the rights of 
others”). 
 54. Id. at 891. 
 55. “Paternalistic” refers to those interventions that are done with the individual’s 
well-being as the goal. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 3. Paternalistic interventions 
contrast with state limitations on individual action that are based on other concerns (for 
example, the rights of others or public health and safety). 
  Paternalism trumps autonomy under a conception of autonomy either 
acknowledging that individuals do not function autonomously in all circumstances (weak 
paternalism), or that in some cases individuals acting “autonomously” are not really 
acting in their own best interests (strong paternalism). BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra 
note 19, at 277–78. Weak paternalism is not inconsistent with autonomy because it is 
basically designed to facilitate what would have been the individual’s decision had all the 
requirements of autonomy been met (for example, if an individual lacks the capacity to 
understand the decision at issue, then a choice might be made for him based on an 
analysis of what the individual himself would have chosen had he truly understood the 
issue at stake). See id. at 277. Arguably, weak paternalism is not really paternalistic 
action at all. Id. at 278. On the other hand, strong paternalism is inconsistent with 
autonomy. If autonomy is an acknowledgment—both that individuals have inherent 
sovereignty over their persons and that the individual is the best judge of what is in her 
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state are not permissible, either to promote individual autonomy 
or to limit the individual’s ability to give up autonomy.56 Kantian 
theory supports this notion by suggesting that individuals have 
inherent worth and self-sovereignty that cannot be given up.57 
Under a descriptive conception, by contrast, autonomy 
depends on certain capacities and varies among different people 
in different circumstances.58 If someone can be said to be more or 
less autonomous, paternalistic interventions to promote 
autonomy may be appropriate.59 A descriptive theory of autonomy 
is compatible with governmental interventions (restrictions) 
designed to assure or increase autonomy of individuals.60 A 
descriptive theory also allows for limitations on waivers of 
autonomy so that autonomy overall may be maximized or, 
alternatively, where autonomy is not maximized, by allowing a 
waiver (either because the autonomy given up is too great or 
because the waiver itself is not truly autonomous). The greater 
the autonomy given up,61 the less willing we should be to allow a 
waiver without strong assurances that the waiver itself is 
autonomous.62 In other words, if the ultimate goal is promotion of 
autonomy, then waivers of rights promoting descriptive 
autonomy should be allowed only to the extent that the waiver 
                                                          
interests—then there is no room for a strong theory of paternalism, which presupposes 
that an external actor can judge what actions would be in an individual’s best interests. 
That is to say, absent some incapacity that interferes with autonomy, there is no room 
within the notion of autonomy for external determinations of best interests. If the 
individual’s decision is truly autonomous, it is de facto in her best interests as she defines 
them (and that is the only definition that matters). See id. at 277. 
 56. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 890–94 (describing ascriptive autonomy as 
“hostile” to paternalism). 
 57. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 13. 
 58. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 877 (observing that descriptive autonomy is a 
matter of degree and that those people with self-awareness may be highly autonomous 
while others who lack self-restraint may not be autonomous at all). 
 59. Professor Fallon identifies four elements that comprise descriptive autonomy: 
(1) “critical and self-critical ability”; (2) “competence to act”; (3) “sufficient options”; and 
(4) “independence of coercion and manipulation.” Id. at 886–89. Some of these elements 
are less developed than others. For example, Professor Fallon appears to include both 
physical and mental ability under the notion of “competence to act,” without much 
discussion of the different implications of each. See id. at 888. Refer to notes 122–26 infra 
(analyzing these elements in depth). Suffice it to say for now that I agree with Professor 
Fallon’s assertion that autonomy has both descriptive and ascriptive components and that 
both of these notions are crucial for understanding waivers. 
 60. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 877–88 (giving the example that regulating 
cigarette advertising that lures people into smoking may promote descriptive autonomy). 
 61. Another way to think about this is to consider the extent to which the right in 
question is linked to autonomy. Refer to note 185 infra (reviewing Mill’s and Professor 
Smith’s views on the relationship between autonomy and certain liberties). 
 62. See Feinberg, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing his reasoning regarding proof of 
voluntariness). 
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itself is autonomous, and the autonomy given up is outweighed 
by the autonomy exercised by the waiver decision. 
Although a large proportion of individual rights have some 
implications for autonomy, not all do. Law in a liberal state is 
presumably designed to promote or protect autonomy,63 but each 
rule within the system is not necessarily designed to recognize or 
to protect individual autonomy. However, once the system is in 
place, certain rules are required to assure that the system 
continues to work as envisioned.64 This category will be referred 
to as “system limitations.” 
A. Ascriptive Autonomy 
Waivers of rights designed to respect ascriptive autonomy 
are the most problematic.65 This is the paradox of autonomous 
waivers—to give up autonomy. The state cannot interfere with 
individual autonomy under an ascriptive conception, nor can the 
individual give up the “moral entailments of personhood.”66 
Rights that implicate ascriptive autonomy can be given up in the 
sense that the state may not interfere with the individual’s 
decision to give up the right.67 However, the state cannot uphold 
a waiver of ascriptive autonomy either. 
                                                          
 63. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 177, 183. 
The turn from liberty to autonomy reflects a shift from higher law views that 
justified the liberal state as the means of achieving a specific substantive goal, 
securing certain natural rights, to more relativistic stances that defend the state 
because it allows for the pursuit of self-chosen ends, now held to be the only ends 
that are legitimate. 
Id. 
 64. Refer to Part II.C infra (discussing system limitations). 
 65. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (stating that 
“[c]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver”). Examples include the 
waiver of the right to jury trial, to associate, and waiver of rights granted by the Bill of 
Rights. See id. 
 66. See Fallon, supra note 35, at 890–91 (remarking that under an ascriptive view 
of autonomy, “all competent adult persons possess the right to be self-governing”); see also 
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (J.W. Gough ed., Macmillan Co. 
1956) (1946) (“For a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact, or his 
own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary 
power of another to take away his life when he pleases.”). 
 67. This has some interesting implications for control over bodily integrity. For 
example, the Supreme Court has concluded that the right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment was so rooted in U.S. history, tradition, and practice as to require special 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 
U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990). Because, under an ascriptive theory, the state can neither 
disallow nor uphold a waiver of the right to control bodily integrity, the notion of waiver of 
informed consent may seem problematic. Refer to Part IV.A infra (discussing waiver of 
informed consent). 
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In practice, few waivers are barred under ascriptive 
autonomy.68 One rare example, however, is the restriction on 
selling oneself into slavery. Under an ascriptive notion, the state 
cannot intervene and punish someone who decides to sell himself 
into slavery, and may not even be able to invalidate the decision 
unless the decision infringes other individuals’ autonomy. 
Determining what decisions have purely individual repercussions 
is the crux of the problem.69 The state cannot step in and restrict 
autonomy in ascriptive cases based solely on concerns about the 
individual giving up autonomy, but must justify the interference 
on some other ground.70 For example, state restrictions on things 
such as prostitution71 and illegal migrant workers72 (two 
examples often compared with the sales of one’s body or labor 
into slavery) are sometimes justified because of their effect on 
other people. In the absence of “other-regarding” concerns, the 
state can neither restrict nor enforce a contract for slavery if the 
individual who initially agreed to the servitude chooses not to 
uphold her end of the bargain. Total and permanent control over 
one’s self (body) is not something that can be transferred (such a 
contract would be voidable at the very least).73 Although contracts 
                                                          
 68. Usually ascriptive and descriptive categories overlap. That is, some rights 
reflect values related to ascriptive autonomy, but the rules (laws) developed to implement 
or protect the underlying rights focus on descriptive autonomy. For example, the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination presumably reflects, in part, the societal 
value of individual self-sovereignty and thus ascriptive autonomy, but the Miranda 
warnings are designed to facilitate individual knowledge of rights and thus exercises of 
descriptive autonomy. Many of the rights protected by the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of 
Rights fit this categorization. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–IX. Although laws based on an 
ascriptive conception of autonomy are rare (if not non-existent), laws based on a 
descriptive notion of autonomy are quite prevalent. Included here are legal protections 
designed to assure promotion and protection of individual autonomy such as informed 
consent, fiduciary obligations, and minimum wage laws. See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. 
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706–07 (1945) (disallowing waiver of minimum wage laws). 
 69. The “other-regarding” issue has the potential to swallow the general rule 
because we might be able to define almost anything in terms of its “other-regarding” 
effect. One way to address this issue is to require a process for societal agreement 
regarding restrictions on autonomy. Refer to note 185 infra (discussing Professor Smith’s 
preference for a theoretical process where individuals mutually decide upon the limits of 
freedom). 
 70. For example, Feinberg notes that a ban on slavery can be justified because 
weakening respect for human dignity can lead to harm to nonconsenting parties. 
Feinberg, supra note 34, at 13. State interests in protecting nonconsenting parties may be 
strong enough to justify interference with individual liberty and may even allow for state 
action (criminal penalties) against the individual parties involved. 
 71. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. No. 688 (1901) (outlawing prostitution). 
 72. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 970 (West 2003) (outlawing misrepresentations 
designed to lure migrant workers to another place of work). 
 73. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 227–28, 243–45 (1911) (holding that a 
state statute which requires compulsory service to pay a debt constitutes involuntary 
servitude and violates the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution). 
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for personal services are not slavery, the analysis may be similar. 
In a contract for personal services, the individual retains the 
right to refuse to accord the services.74 While monetary damages 
are an appropriate remedy in such cases, specific performance is 
not.75 
The practical effect of ascriptive autonomy is small, and will 
generally turn out not to be a limiting factor. In all cases where it 
is a limiting factor, there should be some prior indications that 
ascriptive autonomy is at issue. Specifically, the cases should be 
analogous to the slavery situation, and are likely to be focused on 
the sale or other “use” of one’s physical body. For example, the 
appropriateness of surrogate gestational motherhood (“womb 
donation,” where a woman carries a fetus genetically unrelated 
to her and without any intent to rear the child after birth) has 
raised questions of waiver of ascriptive autonomy.76 Yet, despite 
the limited real-world impact, the ascriptive conception is useful 
for explaining why there are some limits on waivers of certain 
rights that are essential for autonomy, even when the waiver 
itself appears to be completely autonomous and the effect on 
other people’s autonomy is insignificant. 
B. Descriptive Autonomy 
Waivers of rights that promote descriptive autonomy are not 
inherently inconsistent. A descriptive theory allows waivers of 
autonomy if, and only if, the waiver both promotes autonomy and 
promotes more autonomy than is lost by sacrificing the right. 
Because the goal is to increase autonomy, governmental 
interference with waiver is permissible if the waiver would have 
resulted in a decrease in overall autonomy, taking into account 
the autonomy entailed in the waiver decision. The challenge is to 
balance the degree to which the waiver decision is autonomous 
and the degree of autonomy given up because of the waiver. That 
                                                          
 74. See Kronman, supra note 14, at 783 (noting that a contracting party who later 
regrets his agreement may abandon that agreement and compensate the other party). 
 75. Id. at 779, 783 (explaining that allowing an employer to compel specific 
performance would be inappropriate because it would, in effect, make an employment 
contract enslaving). One way to think about this is to say that a contract for personal 
services is voidable. It is valid when made, and continues in force until the party obligated 
to perform the personal services fails to do so. Equity principles can then be applied to 
allow monetary damages to the other party if appropriate, but specific performance of the 
contract would not be permitted. 
 76. See, e.g., David H. Smith, Wombs for Rent, Selves for Sale?, 4 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH. L. & POL’Y 23, 33–34 (1988) (considering the analogy between gestational 
surrogacy and contracts for slavery). However, even this may not be a proper example 
because womb donors remain free to terminate the pregnancy within the appropriate 
legal limitations on abortion, and consequently, the “waivers” are not comprehensive. 
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is, if the waiver of a right decreases autonomy, then that loss of 
autonomy should be counterbalanced by the increase of 
autonomy gained by respecting the waiver decision. For 
correspondingly smaller waivers of autonomy, the waiver itself 
may be less autonomous. 
In some cases the balancing may be done ahead of time, on a 
general level.77 For example, Professor Gerald Dworkin points out 
that some state paternalistic actions are justified because they 
are “the only feasible means of achieving some benefit which is 
recognized as such by all concerned.”78 Maximum weekly work 
hours79 and even strict liability protections80 fit into this 
category.81 These are laws designed to increase overall descriptive 
autonomy, but to do so, they restrict individual autonomy in 
specific cases by limiting the extent to which individuals can opt-
out of the protection. However, they do so not because individuals 
in each case are unable to recognize or judge their own interests 
(for example, because the individual lacks autonomy), but rather 
because the only way to assure protection of the interests in 
question (to which everyone agrees initially) is to make an 
across-the-board rule, enforced by the state.82 In other words, the 
                                                          
 77. This is based on the concept of a social contract. Professor Gerald Dworkin 
argues that this includes “consent to a system of government, run by elected 
representatives, with an understanding that they may act to safeguard our interests in 
certain limited ways.” Dworkin, supra note 34, at 29. 
 78. Id. at 23. 
 79. Id. (arguing that legislation forbidding employees to work more than forty hours 
per week is paternalistic because it is a way for society to impose its own conception of the 
employees’ best interests upon them). 
 80. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) 
(imposing strict liability in tort upon a manufacturer); Linn v. Radio Ctr. Delicatessen, 
Inc., 9 N.Y.S.2d 110, 111–12 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1939) (holding that a pastry manufacturer 
could not disclaim liability for a foreign substance in its food because it would be against 
sound public policy). But see Ausness, supra note 2, at 294, 298 (arguing that individuals 
should be allowed to waive product liability based on both autonomy and efficiency 
claims). 
  Arguably, waivers in the negligence context are limited because of their “other-
regarding” effect. That is, the negligence standard is an efficiency standard, so a waiver of 
negligence would allow an inefficient societal result which has implications for other 
individuals’ autonomy. See Michael D. Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1605–12 (1997) (discussing Judge Posner’s view that most tort law 
rules, including negligence, promote economic efficiency). 
 81. For example, unemployment compensation and usury laws cannot be waived. 
See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 502 P.2d 645, 
653–54 (Kan. 1972) (unemployment compensation); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS § 1515, at 731–32 (1962) (usury laws). 
 82. This is a type of rule-utilitarian argument. Refer to note 29 supra (noting that 
“[r]ule-utilitarianism seeks to effectuate rules that will generally result in the greatest 
good”). The best state of affairs (the maximization of autonomy) occurs if a general rule is 
applied across the board. The “agreement” here is a priori. That is, theoretically, 
individuals would agree ahead of time, not knowing their individual circumstances at the 
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interest identified at the outset is in having a maximum work 
hours standard that applies to all situations. If individuals are 
allowed to opt-out, then the protection would not function.83 
Individual exceptions are not allowed because they would either 
undermine the general rule (thus implicating other people’s 
autonomy)84 or because of the belief that some individuals could 
never make a truly autonomous decision to waive the protection 
due to the power inequities of the relationship. Autonomy may 
always be absent from relationships with significant power 
differentials;85 furthermore, measuring autonomy in these 
situations would be so difficult it may be practically impossible or 
unduly burdensome.86 
Therefore, waivers of rights designed to promote descriptive 
autonomy may be restricted on a number of bases. Society 
(individuals collectively) may determine that the balance of 
autonomy overall generally favors protection87 because (1) 
allowing individual waivers would undermine the autonomy of 
others; (2) individual waivers could never be autonomous; or (3) 
the burden of proving that the waiver meets the requisite level of 
autonomy in each case may be too costly.88 Alternatively, in a 
                                                          
time of a later potential waiver, that waivers should not be allowed. 
 83. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 14, at 772 (using nondisclaimable warranties of 
habitability as an example of an instrument of redistribution that is nonwaivable because 
if it were allowed to be waived, poor tenants would “routinely be required to waive their 
rights to habitable premises, thereby restoring whatever distributional inequities exist at 
the outset”). 
 84. Rights conferred upon a private party but affecting the public interest cannot be 
waived, as such waiver “would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to 
effectuate.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945). 
 85. Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate 
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 755, 759, 760 (1978) (discussing inequities in bargaining 
power). 
 86. Feinberg, supra note 34, at 14 (arguing that testing voluntariness is expensive 
and fallible). 
 87. This is akin to Mill’s utilitarian argument for restricting slavery. Refer to note 
40 supra and accompanying text (explaining that Mill’s argument for restricting slavery 
suggests that slavery is per se harmful, thus outweighing any harm that occurs from 
restricting autonomy). See also Richard Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human 
Experimentation and the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 499–500 (1996) 
(arguing that the U.S. Constitution itself is an example of this “self-paternalism” because 
“the framers knew the dangers of policy based on emergency and expediency, and the 
occasional attractiveness of utility-based or even bigotry-based action, it made sense to 
prospectively limit what government could do to us and what we could do to each other 
and ourselves”). 
 88. This is akin to Feinberg’s argument in the slavery context. Refer to note 48 
supra and accompanying text (acknowledging the need for limitations on autonomy 
because of practical concerns). See also Kronman, supra note 14, at 768–69 (suggesting 
that a rationale for restricting waivers of certain contractual entitlements may be based 
on the concern that “if most of the waivers that are given are procured through fraud, and 
if the fraud can rarely be proven, the inefficiencies of a nonwaiver rule may be outweighed 
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particular situation the autonomy given up by waiver may 
outweigh the autonomy of the individual’s decision to waive; 
however, this determination must be made on a case-by-case 
basis. Part III examines waivers of descriptive autonomy in more 
detail. 
C. System Limitations 
Many rights cannot be waived, not because of the link 
between the right and autonomy, but because of the implications 
of waiver for the system as a whole.89 For example, at trial, 
criminal defendants cannot waive the right to have guilt proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt,90 nor can they waive the subject 
matter jurisdiction of a court.91 These are examples of procedural 
protections designed to assure that our criminal justice system 
functions in a particular way.92 There is nothing in and of itself 
valuable, from an autonomy standpoint, about limiting the issues 
that different courts can adjudicate. In other words, the subject 
matter jurisdiction of a court is not a right that is designed 
specifically to promote individual autonomy. Moreover, we can 
envision a truly autonomous (and rational) decision by an 
                                                          
by the greater inefficiency of enforcing too many fraudulent bargains”). Kronman also 
notes that information asymmetries often create this situation. Id. at 770. 
 89. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 87, at 496 (arguing that “we often balance our 
general preference for unfettered respect for consensual arrangements against other 
concerns . . . aim[ed] at increasing systemic efficiency”). 
 90. This is true in cases where the defendant does not enter a guilty plea. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in a criminal charge is constitutionally mandated). 
 91. King, supra note 2, at 133 (“[S]ome deals—an agreement to circumvent subject 
matter jurisdiction or an agreement to be sentenced by orangutans . . . [are 
unenforceable] . . . because of the harm such agreements cause to an interest or value 
independent of the preferences of the defendant and prosecution.” (footnote omitted)). 
Professor King stresses, however, that the category of subject matter jurisdiction 
encompasses a number of issues and may not serve a useful purpose for identifying 
unwaivable errors. Id. at 145–47; see also Zacharias, supra note 2, at 420 (discussing 
system issues with respect to waivers of conflicts of interest). 
Society may also desire unconflicted representation as a means to further the 
pursuit of truth, or, at least, of appropriate results within the adversary 
system . . . . [It] has a right to insist that, when the adversary system is invoked, 
the processes work in accordance with the system’s premises. 
Id. 
 92. We might say that these rights are necessary to ensure system integrity 
(reliability) and thus required to maintain support for the system in a liberal society. 
Alternatively, it may be possible to argue that these are really issues of waivers of rights 
that have implications for other individuals. But it is hard to see how this is so, except 
that waivers in this context would undermine the system as a whole and thus affect other 
people. The concern in the latter situation is with indirect effects. So someone analyzing 
these process rights under a “harm to others” theory may come to the same conclusion I 
do in limiting waivers. 
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individual to waive a jurisdictional bar, and such a decision 
would not implicate the individual’s inherent right of self-
sovereignty or interfere with protections put in place to assure 
autonomous decisions and actions. But this and other rules 
promote the type of criminal justice system our society has 
chosen. Allowing individual waivers of these kinds of rights93 
would undermine the system, and ultimately undermine the goal 
sought to be achieved by putting the original process or 
protection in place—to assure a system that guarantees the 
greatest protections for each individual’s autonomy. 
Limitations on waivers that do not directly implicate 
autonomy may appear difficult to reconcile with the theory 
described here. It is possible, however, to conceive of these rights, 
and the restrictions on their waiver, as ones that individuals 
would agree to in advance; individuals may do so either 
specifically, or more likely, by agreeing to be governed by 
representatives who then put forward the specific procedural 
rules.94 If we accept this social contract explanation, limitations 
on waiver of such rights are compatible with an autonomy 
theory. Consider the difference between what cognitive 
behavioral psychologist Jean Piaget refers to as “constitutive” 
and “constituted” rules.95 The former are the rules required for 
the system to function—they are necessary preconditions for 
creating any rules in the first place.96 The latter are rules created 
under the system of constitutive rules.97 For example, Rawls’s 
hypothetical construct of a “veil of ignorance” is a type of 
constitutive rule—that is, all (constituted) rules in a just society 
should be created under a fair situation where individuals are 
                                                          
 93. The term “procedural right” does not mean a less important right. Thus, one 
might talk about fundamental procedural rights, such as the right to jury trial. See, e.g., 
Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (stating that courts will “indulge 
every reasonable presumption” that the right to a jury trial has not been waived). 
 94. See Dworkin, supra note 34, at 29 (drawing a distinction between specifically 
requesting enforcement of a measure and electing a government to make that decision on 
the public’s behalf). 
 95. JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 92–93 (1932). 
 96. See Arthur J. Dyck & Herbert W. Richardson, The Moral Justification for 
Research Using Human Subjects, Use of Human Subjects, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS AND THE 
LAW 245–46 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder eds., 1976) (describing a social 
system’s need for both benefits and structural values that secure those benefits); Hans 
Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting on Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 219, 
228 (1969) (“Society . . . cannot ‘afford’ a single miscarriage of justice, a single inequity in 
the dispensation of its laws, the violation of the rights of even the tiniest minority, 
because these undermine the moral basis on which society’s existence rests.”). 
 97. See Dyck & Richardson, supra note 96, at 244–45 (explaining that rules that 
prevent harm to individuals can be waived if the potential benefit outweighs the risk of 
harm, but violations of structural values cannot be tolerated because such violations could 
compromise the social systems from which all benefits are derived). 
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unaware of their particular situation and needs, making them 
free to be “objective.”98 To the extent that a right implicates a 
constitutive rule, individuals may not waive it because its 
absence would undermine our ability to create any other 
governing rules and to enforce our pre-existing constituted 
rules.99 Of course, as with difficulties in drawing lines between 
individual actions and other actions, it is not always clear which 
rules may be deemed constitutive and which are constituted. 
Alternatively, we might justify system limitations on 
individual autonomy because the waivers in question affect other 
people. Allowing an individual to be found guilty (in the absence 
of a plea of guilty) without the requisite level of proof, even if the 
individual waives the burden of proof, makes it more likely that 
the determination of guilt is erroneous. A society that wrongfully 
labels and punishes innocent people may diminish the autonomy 
of both the innocent person in question as well as people 
generally who feel they cannot act freely for fear of wrongful 
prosecution and punishment. Or, to tie in with Piaget’s 
framework, undermining constitutive rules will lead to a 
breakdown of society (because other rules cannot be formed or 
enforced in their absence), thus harming other people. In either 
event, both arguments serve to justify limitations on individual 
autonomous waivers of pure process rights.100 
Alternatively, system limitations may be necessary not 
because the rule in question functions as a constitutive rule 
(required for the formation of the system in the first place), but 
because at this point, given the currently functioning system, 
changing the rules may result in unintended problems.101 That is 
to say, because each individual functioning within the system 
will be unable to know all the effects of a change, and because 
society is a complex system, any small change in one part of the 
system will have implications for numerous other parts.102 As a 
                                                          
 98. Refer to note 29 supra (discussing Rawls’s adaptation of Kantian ethics). 
 99. See Dyck & Richardson, supra note 96, at 245–46. 
 100. Many rights have both procedural and substantive components. For example, 
the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are 
generally procedural in nature, but ultimately are designed to protect individual privacy, 
an inherent part of autonomy. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 
190 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of “right to privacy” in Fourth 
Amendment cases); Spritzer, supra note 2, at 478–79 (disagreeing with the Court’s 
decision in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte that the Fourth Amendment does not have 
anything to do with “promoting the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial”). 
 101. See 1 HAYEK, supra note 27, at 60 (explaining that an ordered society is the 
result of evolution constrained by certain guiding principles rather than an arrangement 
of discrete elements). 
 102. Id. This is also the basis of “chaos theory” (also termed “complexity theory”). 
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result, there may be limits on individual waivers of rights that 
are designed merely to structure the system in a particular 
way.103 
Moreover, some rights are considered to be waived if they 
are not asserted at the appropriate time. The rights in question 
may be either process protections or descriptive autonomy 
protections that otherwise could be waived. Failure to act within 
a specific timeframe results in what might be called constructive 
waiver, and is sometimes referred to as forfeiture, procedural 
default, or laches.104 Timeframe limits are necessary to assure 
that the system functions. In addition, other people may rely on 
the waiver, and thus the time limitations function to protect their 
interests. Arguably this category does not entail true waivers 
because there are no autonomous decisions about each right 
given up. A number of experts in criminal procedure have sought 
to restrict the definition of waiver in such a way. For example, 
Professor George Dix argues that waivers include only a 
defendant’s “conscious willingness to forgo exercise of a right.”105 
Professor Ralph Spritzer distinguishes between waivers and 
procedural default,106 and Professor Peter Westen stresses the 
difference between waiver and forfeiture.107 Such definitional 
limitations of the notion of waiver make sense. However, even if 
included, restrictions on such waivers can be justified because of 
the reliance of (effects on) others and the need for finality in the 
system of laws. 
Although there remains much to be said regarding system 
limitations, such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, 
                                                          
 103. Id. at 61. 
The preservation of a free system is so difficult precisely because it requires a 
constant rejection of measures which appear to be required to secure particular 
results, on no stronger grounds than that they conflict with a general rule, and 
frequently without our knowing what will be the costs of not observing the rule 
in the particular instance. 
 Id. 
 104. Laches is the lapse of a right due to a failure to assert it. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 874 (7th ed. 1999). The two elements are: (1) “the plaintiff unreasonably and 
inexcusably delayed” in bringing his claim, and (2) the delay materially prejudiced the 
defendant. Laura M. Burson, Comment, A.C. Auckerman and the Federal Circuit: What Is 
the Standard of Review for a Summary Judgment Ruling on Laches or Equitable 
Estoppel?, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 799, 804 (1999). 
 105. Dix, supra note 2, at 196. 
 106. Spritzer, supra note 2, at 474–75 (defining procedural default as “the loss of a 
right through a failure by the accused or his representative to assert the claim in a 
prescribed manner or at a required time”). 
 107. Westen, supra note 2, at 1214, 1238 (noting that forfeiture can occur without an 
individual “ever having made a deliberate, informed decision to relinquish” the right in 
question and concluding that forfeitures are justified by the overriding interests of the 
state, not the consent of the defendant as is the case in waivers). 
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which is designed to focus primarily on autonomy rights and 
waivers within the individual realm. But even so, we must 
acknowledge the existence of system limitations on individual 
autonomy, even in a society that seeks to promote individual 
freedom over all else. The rationales justifying such limitations 
include: (1) the necessity of the rule for the system to function 
initially; (2) the potential effects on others (including reliance); 
and (3) the unintentional effects of interfering with a currently 
functioning and evolved system. 
D. Summary 
This section has identified three categories of “rights” one 
may seek to waive: ascriptive, descriptive, and systems. It is 
worth pausing for a moment to consider how this framework 
might be applied. The issue is whether the state should enforce 
or recognize an individual’s waiver of a particular right. A 
determination that a waiver is not permissible is not, in itself, 
grounds for criminal or civil penalties against the person waiving 
the right.108 An impermissible waiver would simply not be 
recognized or enforced, or perhaps be voidable by the individual 
who waives the right in the first place.109 Where both parties are 
satisfied with the result(s) of the waiver, no state interference is 
warranted. Only where one party—presumably the one who 
waived the right in question, but possibly another party affected 
by the waiver—challenges the ultimate outcome must the state 
decide whether to enforce the waiver (let the result stand) or to 
negate the waiver (which may involve either a determination 
that the waiver was invalid in the first place, or voidable). Unlike 
an invalid waiver, a voidable waiver would be considered valid at 
the time of inception, but could be voided by the individual who 
                                                          
 108. Saying that an action lacks autonomy and need not be respected on that ground 
does not mean that we, as a society, may not continue to allow the action, or even hold the 
individual responsible for the consequences of the action. But these determinations must 
be made on different grounds than autonomy. Actions that are non-autonomous, such as 
yawning or sneezing or sleepwalking, are not in and of themselves bad or even 
problematic. But consider the example of a sleepwalker who wanders out of the house and 
destroys a neighbor’s property. Despite the fact that the sleepwalker’s actions were not 
autonomous (in the sense of not being intentional), we may still hold the sleepwalker 
responsible for paying for the damage. The theory of responsibility is not based on the fact 
that the sleepwalker could have controlled his actions, but that he should have taken 
steps to prevent the occurrence (perhaps by installing a door alarm that would awaken 
him when he attempts to exit the house). Alternatively, we hold the sleepwalker 
accountable because we believe it to be fairer in this instance to have him pay for the 
damage than the neighbor, even though neither is morally at fault. 
 109. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979) (stating that a 
contract is voidable if the assent to the contract is induced by duress). 
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waived the right in question.110 The difference may have 
implications both for who can challenge the waiver and the 
results of the challenge. 
Because the starting presumption is that waivers should be 
allowed, the best way to apply the framework identified above is 
to begin with a consideration of the reasons for limiting waivers. 
In general, when faced with a question of whether a waiver 
should be upheld, a court111 should first consider whether the 
right in question raises issues of autonomy. If not, the court must 
determine whether there are system reasons for limiting the 
waiver. Many of these reasons have already been identified and 
courts can draw from pre-existing law (for example, the legal 
doctrines of laches in contract and forfeiture in criminal 
procedure).112 Issues of first impression should be determined by 
analyzing the extent to which the waiver in question either 
addresses a constitutive rule—that is, a rule that is important for 
the functioning of the system as a whole—or raises concerns 
about the unintended consequences of allowing alterations in an 
established rule. In effect, this is a balancing test involving the 
individual’s right to autonomous waiver and societal interests in 
system constraints.113 If the balance favors societal interests (the 
burden should be fairly high), the waiver may be disallowed. 
Where the right sought to be waived involves autonomy, a 
court should consider whether the waiver should be restricted 
because of the implications for ascriptive autonomy. As noted 
previously, such cases should be extremely rare. If we take 
slavery as our paradigm example, other waivers should be 
limited only to the extent that they are strongly analogous to the 
slavery situation. At issue, usually, will be the use of an 
individual’s physical body, such as in the case of contracts for 
personal services. Finally, if there are neither system nor 
ascriptive autonomy reasons for limiting a waiver, a court should 
consider the issue of descriptive autonomy. 
                                                          
 110. For example, waivers involved in contracts for personal services are voidable. 
Refer to Part II.A supra. 
 111. Courts will generally be the bodies adjudicating waivers. But it is also possible 
for a legislature to make a priori determinations regarding the permissibility of waivers, 
and it should take into account the same factors when choosing to exercise this power. 
 112. The system of contracts could not function if there was not a time bar to 
challenges. Likewise, the criminal system could not function if every conviction were open 
to re-examination indefinitely. See Westen, supra note 2, at 1256 (arguing that the issue 
with forfeiture in the criminal context is the state reliance on the finality of convictions). 
 113. See, e.g., id. at 1258 (proposing that a defendant’s freedom of choice, alone, is 
not sufficient to justify the waiver of constitutional defenses). 
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III. ELEMENTS OF A VALID WAIVER 
The above framework provides two initial bases for 
determining when waivers should be limited—some because of 
system constraints, and others because they interfere with 
ascriptive autonomy. The final task is to develop in more detail 
limitations on waivers of descriptive autonomy. Most disputed 
waivers fall into this category.114 The issue in these cases is 
whether society ought to respect an individual’s decision as 
autonomous.115 In general, we assume that individuals who have 
certain capacities make autonomous decisions—we do not 
scrutinize every decision made. Only where the risks of the 
decision are particularly weighty do we attach additional 
safeguards to assure autonomy. This results in different 
standards for evaluating different types of waivers and different 
safeguards around the waiver process. The following sections 
first evaluate each element of a valid waiver and then consider 
the safeguards that have been applied to ensure its presence. 
There are few discussions regarding the standards for a so-
called “valid” waiver (one that demonstrates the necessary and 
sufficient level of autonomy). In criminal procedure, most references 
are to the case of Johnson v. Zerbst,116 which speaks of “an 
intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right.”117 Contract law 
standards for valid waiver include disclosure, bargaining, and 
voluntariness.118 Despite the slightly different terminology, the 
elements are all aimed at the same underlying requirements and 
draw from the concept of autonomy.119 Two conditions are needed for 
autonomous action: voluntariness (freedom from controlling 
                                                          
 114. Refer to note 68 supra (describing the overlap of ascriptive and descriptive 
autonomy). Even when the underlying values or rights are fundamentally ascriptive, the 
rules protecting these rights focus on descriptive autonomy. Id. 
 115. The primary question is whether the waiver results in an overall increase in 
autonomy. Refer to Part II.B supra. 
 116. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 117. Id. at 464. 
 118. See generally Rubin, supra note 15, at 513–14 (summarizing the contract law 
requirements). 
 119. This is where I part most significantly from Rubin’s analysis. Rubin argues that 
the analysis of voluntariness is too vague to permit useful application to evaluations of 
waivers and prefers, instead, the implementation of his functional equivalence standard. 
Id. at 492–93. I argue, on the other hand, that except for system concerns, the only basis 
for limiting waivers is autonomy, and thus the validity of a waiver must be judged against 
autonomy standards. The “confusion” he sees with the interchangeability of the terms 
“voluntariness” and “intention” stems not from an inherent problem with the terms, but 
with the failure to identify from where the standards come—the concept of autonomy. 
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interference) and intention to act (which includes knowledge and 
capacity).120 
Courts often use varying terminology. For example, the 
Court in Johnson lists knowledge separately from intention.121 
Likewise, the contractual requirement of bargaining is a way to 
test voluntariness, and the disclosure requirement is designed to 
facilitate knowledge. Similarly, Professor Fallon identifies four 
factors that comprise his category of “descriptive” autonomy: (1) 
critical and self-critical ability; (2) competence to act; (3) 
sufficient options; and (4) independence from coercion and 
manipulation.122 Critical ability and competence are individual 
capacities necessary for intention.123 Independence from coercion 
is an aspect of voluntariness.124 The requirement of sufficient 
options125 speaks in part to the voluntariness requirement, and in 
part to the intention requirement. But not all limitations of 
options necessarily limit autonomy—there will be situations in 
which individuals may feel they have no choice, but the decisions 
in those cases should not be deemed involuntary and thus 
lacking autonomy.126 
                                                          
 120. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
1752 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (describing involuntary actions as those stemming from 
compulsion). Aristotle claims that knowledge is also a requirement for voluntariness. Id. 
at 1753 (“Everything that is done by reason of ignorance is non-voluntary . . . .”); see also 
RALPH MCINERNY, AQUINAS ON HUMAN ACTION: A THEORY OF PRACTICE 14–20 (1992) 
(discussing Aquinas’s views on voluntariness, knowledge, and intention). Although both 
Aristotle and Aquinas use the terms nonvoluntary and involuntary to refer to actions that 
stem from a lack of knowledge, I characterize knowledge as a requirement for intention 
and restrict “voluntariness” to the absence of controlling influences. See BEAUCHAMP & 
CHILDRESS, supra note 19, at 121 (“Virtually all theories of autonomy agree that two 
conditions are essential: (1) liberty (independence from controlling influences) and (2) 
agency (capacity for intentional action. However, disagreement exists over the meaning of 
these two conditions . . . .”); see also Neil Scheurich, MORAL ATTITUDES AND MENTAL 
DISORDERS, 32 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 15–16 (free will means “that a 
process of deliberation has its own internal momentum and agency and is guided by the 
individual in question”). 
 121. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (“A waiver is ordinarily an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” (emphasis added)). 
 122. Fallon, supra note 35, at 886–89. 
 123. Refer to Part III.B infra. 
 124. Refer to Part III.A infra. 
 125. For a discussion of the role of options in autonomy, see MAY, supra note 19, at 
36–37, 71–73. 
 126. Refer to Part IV.A infra (advocating waiver of informed consent in medical 
contexts where the autonomy given up is balanced against the autonomy of the waiver 
itself). 
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A. Voluntariness: Freedom from Coercion 
There are very few legal definitions of voluntariness, and even 
the ethical dimensions of the concept remain unclear.127 Although 
the exact contours may not be established, it is often stated that 
actions that occur as the result of coercion are not voluntary.128 
For example, wills are voided if the testator was subjected to 
undue influence,129 criminal confessions are voided if coerced,130 and 
contracts entered into under duress are voidable.131 In Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte,132 the Supreme Court stated that a waiver is not 
valid if “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or 
covert force.”133 But the definition of coercion has never been clearly 
established—only what counts as coercion in particular cases.134 
Actual force is clear-cut,135 but rare in practice.136 More 
complicated are the other pressures on individuals that may 
                                                          
 127. Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, uses an extremely broad definition of 
voluntary: “Done by design or intention . . . . Unconstrained by interference; not impelled by 
outside influence.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1569 (7th ed. 1999). 
 128. Dix, supra note 2, at 243 (“‘[I]t may prove impossible for courts to determine whether 
a surrender of rights is truly “voluntary.” . . . But we can ensure that decisions are not coerced 
by pressures which the criminal process itself creates or which result from discriminations 
within the reach of established constitutional protections.’” (alterations in original) (quoting 
Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court, 1969 Term—Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: 
Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1970))); Stephen J. Ware, Employment 
Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 109–10 (1996) (noting that consent 
in contracts can be either voluntary or coerced—implying that coerced agreements are the 
opposite of voluntary ones). 
 129. 1 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 15.3, at 
718–20 (1960). 
 130. Colorado v. Connelly, 497 U.S. 157, 166–167 (1986). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979). There are differing notions of 
what counts as “coercion” under contract law. See Sian E. Provost, Note, A Defense of a Rights-
Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in Contract Law, 73 TEX. L. REV. 629, 633 (1995). 
 132. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 133. Id. at 228 (discussing Fourth Amendment waivers). 
 134. Individual perception appears to play a significant role in determining what 
constitutes coercion. See John Monahan et al., Coercion to Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results 
and Implications for Assertive Treatment in the Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE 
COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 3, 23 (Deborah L. Dennis 
& John Monahan eds., 1996). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has stressed that voluntariness 
in the criminal context is “defined not by a defendant’s subjective perception, but by public 
policy concerns.” Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 953–54. 
 135. In fact, the legal concept of voluntariness first appeared in Roman canon law and the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure, the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina of 1532. Laurence A. 
Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical 
Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 93 (1988). Both focused on the unreliability of a tortured 
confession (a common practice at the time). Id. at 93–94. Likewise, contract law generally 
defines duress as physical force. See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of 
the Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 511 (2001). 
 136. E. Allan Farnsworth, Coercion in Contract Law, 5 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 329, 
330 (1982) (stating that “cases of duress by physical compulsion are rare”). Professor 
Farnsworth also notes that cases of duress by threat of physical harm are also rare. Id. 
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compromise their freedom. Human interaction is never free of 
pressures. Many pressures are inherent and constitute a normal 
and often desirable part of relationships. Such pressures are often 
intended to, and do in fact, influence the person to whom they are 
directed. Establishing which pressures affect behavior so extremely 
as to deprive it of some legal consequences it might otherwise have 
may be difficult. The philosopher Alan Wertheimer notes that 
inducements, persuasion, and authority are all forms of pressure 
that may be coercive in certain circumstances.137 He distinguishes 
between a threat that is coercive and an offer that is not—a 
proposal that makes a person worse off (judged against the relevant 
baseline) is a threat, whereas one that does not is an offer.138 The 
classic proposal of “your money or your life” is a threat because the 
individual’s baseline immediately prior included both money and 
life, and the choice limits the person’s options. Others have 
attempted to define influences along a spectrum ranging from 
persuasion, to inducements, to threats, to force.139 
Although it may be impossible to establish definitively the 
range of actions that may be considered voluntary, we can pinpoint 
which pressures should be considered improper such that the 
resulting waiver will not be deemed valid. It is important to 
recognize that the legal discussion of voluntariness focuses on 
pressures and threats imposed by others.140 Thus, internal pressures 
(such as those imposed by illness), or even imagined outside 
                                                          
 137. Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophical Examination of Coercion for Mental 
Health Issues, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 239, 246–48 (1993). 
 138. Id. at 244; see also Farnsworth, supra note 136, at 331 (distinguishing a threat 
from a promise and stating that the former “manifests an intention to do or not do 
something that is less desirable from the promisee’s point of view than if the alternative 
were the case”). Similarly, Professor Zaibert notes that an action “is voluntary if and only 
if at the time it takes place there exists another option open to the agent . . . . Conversely, 
[a] movement is involuntary if and only if at the time it takes place there exists no other 
option open to the agent.” L.A. Zaibert, Intentionality, Voluntariness, and Culpability: A 
Historical-Philosophical Analysis, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 459, 490 (1998). 
 139. See, e.g., RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF 
INFORMED CONSENT 256–62 (1986) (establishing a continuum of influences ranging from 
coercion, which is completely controlling, to persuasion, which is completely non-
controlling); John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis 
of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 129, 130–32 (1991); Monahan et 
al., supra note 134, at 17–18 (studying the various levels of pressures that may influence 
a person’s decisionmaking process when considering hospitalization). 
 140. See Benner, supra note 135, at 128, 139–42 (stating that the trustworthiness of 
confessions is no longer the focus of the criminal law requirements of voluntariness; 
rather, the term is defined in terms of police conduct); Joseph A. Lavigne, A 
Misapplication of the Exclusionary Rule to Voluntary Confessions: The Fallacy that 
Knowingly and Intelligently Made Statements Are Constitutional Prerequisites to 
Admissibility, 1999 MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 677, 680–81 (noting that criminal confessions 
may be voluntary even if coerced as long as the coercion was not the result of government 
(police) action). 
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pressures may not invalidate a waiver. For example, the Supreme 
Court has held that a confession is not involuntary when the 
defendant disclosed information to law enforcement authorities 
after being directed to do so by voices in his head.141 Thus, the 
concern is not necessarily that a waiver was freely given in some 
psychological or philosophical sense of the term, but that it is not 
the result of improper pressures.142 
Respect for autonomy presupposes that the individual in 
question will determine which pressures to take into account in 
making decisions. An external observer can decide whether 
certain pressures are improper from a societal standpoint, but 
not whether the individual should incorporate them into her 
decisionmaking process.143 Which pressures are considered 
“improper” depend on an evaluation of the role of the parties 
                                                          
 141. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170–71 (1986) (explaining that the 
“Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to 
confess emanating from sources other than official coercion” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. See Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 947–48 (stating that a confession may 
have been coerced if the result of “threats, misrepresentation, or improper promises”); see 
also Rick Bigwood, Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress, 46 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 201, 206 (1996) (stating that “the emphasis of legally cognizable coercion—
duress—appears today to have less to do with questions of ‘freedom’ or ‘voluntariness’ 
than with questions of propriety: ‘wrongness’ or ‘unfairness’”). 
 143. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 1752 (stating that “with regard to the things 
that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object . . . , it may be debated 
whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary”). Aristotle suggests that some actions 
will be considered voluntary because they are “worthy of choice at the time when they are 
done,” but nonetheless may be considered in the abstract involuntary “for no one would 
choose any such act in itself.” Id. at 1752–53. He uses the examples of throwing goods 
overboard during a storm at sea to protect a crew’s safety. Id. at 1752. Contrast this with 
Kant’s view that any external influences undermine autonomy. See MAY, supra note 19, 
at 48–51 (comparing Aristotle and Kant on this point). 
  For example, in the context of human experimentation, there is a great deal of 
disagreement about whether and how much financial compensation should be offered in 
recruiting subjects because of the concern regarding the coercive effect on the decision to 
participate. See, e.g., Christine Grady, Money for Research Participation: Does It 
Jeopardize Informed Consent?, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 40–69 (2001) (including peer 
commentaries debating the issue of financial compensation for human experimentation). 
Determining that compensation should not be offered (or that it is excessive) is a 
reflection of what pressures we (society) feel are appropriate in this context. Id. at 42. It is 
quite another thing to state that subjects should not be choosing to participate in clinical 
trials based on financial considerations—a paternalistic imposition on individual liberty 
to decide whether to be involved in a research protocol. Id. The latter replaces the 
subject’s right to autonomous decisionmaking (and thus consideration of whatever factors 
he or she thinks are appropriate) with a societal determination. Id. Consider Justice 
Brandeis’s famous quote regarding the dangers of paternalism: “Experience should teach 
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the government’s purposes are 
beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty . . . . 
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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involved.144 Moreover, it is important to recognize that 
voluntariness is not an all-or-nothing determination; there are 
degrees of voluntariness.145 Therefore, the legal issue is whether 
the action in question lacks voluntariness to the degree that it 
should be considered involuntary and thus the resulting waiver 
labeled “invalid.” Voluntariness, in this sense, is “best viewed as 
a social construct rather than as discoverable metaphysical 
reality.”146 
From a legal standpoint then, the voluntariness of a waiver, 
or the focus of an inquiry related to voluntariness, depends on 
the context. In the criminal context the focus is on improper 
governmental (police) action.147 In the contract setting, on the 
other hand, the concern is with an improper threat from a 
private party.148 Included are threats of physical harm and illegal 
or unlawful action.149 In addition, some threats of legal action 
have also been held to be improper if they are considered by the 
evaluating court to be unfair.150 Identifying which pressures a 
court or legislature will determine to be unfair is beyond the 
                                                          
 144. See, e.g., Provost, supra note 131, at 651 (arguing that determining whether a 
contract should be invalidated because of “coercion” rests on an analysis of the 
substantive rights of the parties involved). In other words, determining what counts as an 
improper pressure depends on the rights of the respective parties to make decisions in the 
absence of certain pressures. According to Provost, the standard in contract law is fairly 
vague, but encompasses the notion that a party to a contract has the “right to receive the 
property of whoever chooses to contract with him . . . and a right to receive that property 
under conditions that are favorable enough to him.” Id. at 660. 
 145. See, e.g., Scheurich, supra note 120, at 16 (stating that free will is never 
absolute, but exists by degrees); Cass R. Sunstein, A Note on “Voluntary” Versus 
“Involuntary” Risks, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 173, 176 (1997) (“[T]he question 
whether a risk is run voluntarily or not is often not a categorical one but instead a 
question of degree . . . . Of course there are interesting background questions about why 
and when a risk ‘codes’ as voluntary or involuntary . . . .”). 
 146. Scheurich, supra note 120, at 16; see also Bigwood, supra note 142, at 228 
(explaining that “coercion” is a broader concept than “duress,” and the latter focuses on a 
normative baseline determination of the condition the individual ought to be in, rather 
than a purely descriptive baseline resting on the individual’s actual circumstances). 
 147. Refer to notes 151–53 infra and accompanying text (exploring problems with 
police coercion). 
 148. See Farnsworth, supra note 136, at 331 (noting that the Second Restatement of 
Contracts implies that one aspect of determining duress is whether the threat . . . is “of a 
kind that the law condemns”). But see Snyder, supra note 8, at 677 (suggesting that the 
courts distinguish duress from coercion and apply a two-prong test for the latter 
requiring: “(1) . . . a threat to deprive the victim of a legal right, and (2) the victim must 
act reasonably”). 
 149. See Farnsworth, supra note 136, at 333–34 (noting that the “first cases to 
recognize claims of duress involved threats of physical harm” and later cases recognized 
“wrongful” or “unlawful” threats). 
 150. Id. at 335 (“‘A threat is improper if the resulting exchange is not on fair terms, 
and . . . the threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit 
the party making the threat . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(a) (1981))). 
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scope of this Article. Some initial constraints have already been 
indicated, but a full exploration of what pressures should be 
labeled coercive in what circumstances remains to be done. 
Interestingly, there seem to be few instances where a priori 
safeguards are put in place to assure voluntariness of waivers.151 
The reason may be, in part, because of the difficulty in designing 
front-end safeguards against coercion, rather than back-end 
penalties that (hopefully) serve to prevent improper behavior.152 
Because of this difficulty, the remedy in cases of coercion (or 
involuntary waiver) is to allow the party who waived the right in 
question to void his action. Thus, the result is usually to return 
the parties to their initial position, rather than punish the 
perpetrator of the improper pressure.153 
The bottom line is that the voluntariness aspect of a valid 
waiver needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis, usually 
after the waiver has been executed. There may be some 
circumstances so egregious that we can predict, ahead of time, 
that a court would find the actions in question constitute coercion 
per se, and thus the resulting waiver would be invalid. Threats of 
                                                          
 151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a possible example of an a priori 
safeguard against coercion, or at least the courts have interpreted it that way. See, e.g., 
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (stating that Miranda “protects defendants 
against government coercion”). However, this Article argues below that Miranda is more 
about assuring knowledge, which is part of intention, than assuring voluntariness 
(protecting against coercion). 
  There are a number of cases where courts have questioned voluntariness after 
the fact. For example, there have been inquiries in the criminal context regarding the 
circumstances of a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396, 
401–02 (1978) (discussing a case in which the defendant was wounded and under arrest in 
an intensive care unit, and despite his request for a lawyer and his protests that he could 
not think clearly due to pain, the police questioned him for four hours); Gallegos v. 
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1962) (reviewing a case where a fourteen-year-old boy was 
held for five days without access to his parents or a lawyer); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 
U.S. 199, 205–08 (1960) (recognizing that “coercion can be mental as well as physical” 
when the defendant was insane, denied access to friends, relatives, and legal counsel, and 
the deputy sheriff composed the confession); United States ex rel. Wade v. Jackson, 256 
F.2d 7, 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1958) (describing that the defendant was physically assaulted and 
deprived of food and sleep for almost twenty-four hours). 
 152. In effect, the exclusion of Fifth Amendment coerced confessions may function to 
dissuade police from improper action. See Yale Kamisar, On the “Fruits” of Miranda 
Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 1005 
(1995) (arguing that the primary rationale for excluding coerced confessions is to 
discourage improper police methods). But this is a not the same as a safeguard put in 
place to prevent coercion from occurring in particular cases. An example of such a 
safeguard might be a requirement that all interactions with suspects or defendants be 
videotaped (on the assumption that this would restrict unwanted behavior). 
 153. This is not true in all situations. For example, although not common, police 
officers can be prosecuted for extreme behavior in coercing a confession under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 193 
F.2d 294, 294–97 (5th Cir. 1951) (illustrating the prosecution of a police officer for beating 
a suspect to extort a confession). 
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physical force fall into this category. Likewise, there may be some 
situations that evince such a large disparity of bargaining power, 
and thus improper pressures, that we make a societal 
determination not to allow waivers in these contexts,154 or 
perhaps require up-front assurances that the waivers are made 
freely. For example, consider whether a client can waive her 
attorney’s conflict of interest.155 In some jurisdictions such 
waivers are not allowed because of concerns that the lawyer has 
financial incentives to encourage the waiver and the power156 to 
convince her client to agree—basically an across-the-board 
descriptive autonomy limitation on waivers.157 Other jurisdictions 
allow the waivers, but provide a safeguard by requiring that the 
lawyer “think in terms of the conflict rules.”158 For the most part, 
however, determination of improper or unfair pressures will 
occur after the fact and depend on societal standards governing 
at the time of the waiver.159 Waivers of descriptive autonomy 
should generally be presumed voluntary, absent a challenge by a 
party claiming that the waiver was obtained through coercion.  
                                                          
 154. See Anderson, supra note 85, at 755–56 (stating that “[w]here the relative 
bargaining power of the parties is unequal, the extent of non-waivable duties implied by 
law will be much greater”). 
 155. Limitations on client waivers of a lawyer’s conflicts of interest are often based 
on system concerns with assuring a fair and appropriate adversarial process (and thus 
limiting a client’s ability to choose a lawyer whose independent judgment is 
compromised). See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 2, at 420 (asserting that, although a client 
has a right to choose her own counsel, “society has a right to insist that, when the 
adversary system is invoked, the processes work in accordance with the system’s 
premises”); Zywicki, supra note 16, at 308 (describing why the disinterestedness 
requirement may not be waivable in bankruptcy because of the history of ethical abuses 
in this area and the concern about public confidence in the system). In other situations, 
these fiduciary requirements are not waivable because of concerns regarding power 
differentials. 
 156. The power may rest, in part, on knowledge differentials, and thus the 
voluntariness and knowledge categories may overlap to a certain extent. 
 157. See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 422 (noting that an attorney has a huge 
incentive to encourage waiver, because by sending his client to another attorney, a lawyer 
loses not only that particular case but also risks losing future business). To the extent 
that fiduciary obligations are imposed to ensure efficiency in specialized exchanges, 
conflicts of interest may not be waivable. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 85, at 760 
(asserting that “the greater the inequality in bargaining power, the greater the difficulty 
of waiver”). 
 158. Zacharias, supra note 2, at 423. 
 159. See Bigwood, supra note 142, at 230–31 (stressing that duress (coercion) in 
contracts will be determined by examining societal standards or the reasonable 
expectation of the parties). 
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B. Intention: Knowledge and Capacity to Act 
Voluntary action, at minimum, is not the product of an 
improper controlling influence.160 For a waiver to be valid, we 
might also require that the actor demonstrate the intention to 
act.161 For an act to be intentional, the actor must understand the 
act and its consequences.162 
Knowledge requirements have at least two aspects. Consider 
a waiver of trial inherent in a guilty plea. There is a variety of 
information linked to the decision—that the plea involves an 
admission of guilt, that as a result the adjudicatory process will 
move directly to sentencing and no trial will be conducted, and 
that the sentencing may include a number of penalties (for 
example, jail time, probation, and fines).163 For each decision, we 
must establish the following: (1) what information the individual 
must know for the decision to be considered autonomous, and (2) 
to what extent the individual must know the information, which 
is a slightly different issue.164 So, if we require that the individual 
understand that his guilty plea will involve an admission that he 
committed the crime in question and that certain punishments 
may follow, do we also require that the individual be able to 
apply the abstract understanding to his own situation (for 
example, that he may serve a number of years in jail)? To answer 
this question, we need first to examine the different standards of 
capacity and their relation to levels of autonomy.165 
                                                          
 160. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 19, at 121 (declaring that autonomy 
requires “independence from controlling influences”). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Knowledge requires both understanding of the current situation as well as 
understanding of the consequences of different decisions. Dix, supra note 2, at 234 
(“[V]alid waiver should require an awareness of the consequences of waiver that a 
reasonable person faced with the choice would consider.”). In Estelle v. Williams, the 
Court applied the rule of preclusion, which lacks the knowing element required by waiver. 
425 U.S. 501, 512–13 (1976); see also Dix, supra note 2, at 221, 224, 229, 234, 267 (noting 
that there is no such thing as “implied waiver”). But see Developments in the Law, supra 
note 2, at 1629 n.1 (stating that the doctrine of waiver of evidentiary privilege differs from 
traditional concepts waiver in contract or constitutional law, and thus “the holder of an 
evidentiary privilege can waive that privilege without ever being aware that he had it”). 
 163. See Dix, supra note 2, at 221–42 (listing ancillary categories of information 
connected to a guilty plea and detailing the judicial treatment of whether knowledge of 
the information was necessary for a guilty plea to be upheld as an effective waiver of the 
defendant’s rights). 
 164. See id. (discussing the categories of information a defendant might need to know 
to make autonomous decisions). 
 165. Id. at 260 (“[A]n effective waiver presupposes a defendant’s capacity acceptably 
to evaluate and to choose among different courses of action. [However,] [i]t is less clear 
what constitutes the requisite capacity . . . .”). 
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If the validity of a waiver depends on an individual’s 
autonomy, how should we conceptualize different levels of 
descriptive autonomy? It may not be possible to measure the 
autonomy of each decision; instead, we can focus on whether the 
individual in question has the capacity to make an autonomous 
decision, a slightly easier determination. Capacity here is 
evaluated by looking at whether the individual in question 
demonstrated the requisite abilities in making a particular 
decision.166 It involves neither an abstract determination of 
overall capacity nor an evaluation of the reasonableness or 
rationality of the end decision.167 The former would involve many 
of the same difficulties as an abstract determination of autonomy 
(possibly leading to significant interference with individual 
freedom), and the latter would involve external judgments of the 
end decision that would essentially negate respect for the 
individual’s autonomy. 
The MacArthur competence studies identified four capacities 
that courts and legislatures have required for autonomous 
decisionmaking in different situations—choice, understanding, 
appreciation, and reasoning.168 Choice refers to the individual’s 
ability to actually make a decision; understanding refers to 
comprehension of critical information; appreciation refers to a 
type of “deep” understanding or the ability to apply abstractly 
understood information to one’s own situation; and reasoning 
refers to the ability to rationally manipulate information in 
conformance with one’s particular preferences.169 Measuring 
capacity to make an autonomous decision, rather than autonomy 
                                                          
 166. See Jessica Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of 
Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 346–47 (1996) 
(explaining that if a patient’s capacity is impaired, the ability to make a competent 
decision will be weakened). 
 167. See id. at 350–51 (listing the relevant capacities to be considered in an 
assessment of competence as the following: the ability to communicate a choice; the ability 
to understand relevant information; the ability to appreciate the nature of the situation 
and its likely consequences; and the ability to manipulate information rationally). 
 168. Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: 
Development and Validation of a Research Instrument, 21 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 146–47, 
153–56 (1997) (discussing each capacity in detail). There were two MacArthur 
Competence studies: one focused on competence to make medical decisions, and the other 
focused on adjudicative competence. See id. at 141–77 (detailing the MacArthur 
Adjudicative Competence Study); see also Berg et al., supra note 166, at 362–74 
(describing the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study). There are two aspects of 
adjudicative competence: competence to assist counsel and decisional competence. See 
Hoge et al., supra, at 146. These break down into specific competence related abilities 
(modeled after instruments identified in the treatment context) including understanding, 
appreciation, reasoning, and choice. See id. at 149–56. 
 169. See generally BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 100–06 (discussing the four factors 
in the treatment competence setting). 
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directly, has two distinct advantages. First, capacities can often 
be measured using standardized tools.170 Second, evaluating 
capacity requires less intrusion into individual thought 
processes, and thus may be less of an infringement on individual 
autonomous decisionmaking.171 
Once we identify the capacities at stake, we must determine 
the standard against which we will judge capacity. Applying the 
standard will entail choosing which of the four elements (choice, 
understanding, appreciation, or reasoning) will be required,172 
and thus, evaluated, as well as determining how the elements 
will be applied.173 For example, in addition to choosing to apply 
the understanding element, we will also need to establish what 
information needs to be understood and to what degree (50%, 
75%, and so forth).174 
There has been little discussion of the level of capacity 
necessary to waive specific rights. In Godinez v. Moran,175 the 
Supreme Court held that for Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights, 
the level of capacity needed to waive a right is equivalent to the 
level of capacity needed to exercise it.176 This finding may reflect 
an acknowledgement that the implications of the waiver in terms 
of potential effects on the defendant (for example, imprisonment) 
are as significant as those consequences that follow a trial, and 
                                                          
 170. THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT 
TOOL FOR TREATMENT (MACCAT-T) 1–24 (1998) (detailing a test for health professionals 
to measure patients’ decisionmaking capacities with regard to informed consent). 
 171. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 166, at 357–58 (discussing that although 
measuring capacity requires an examination of an individual’s thought processes, 
specifically the ability to rationally manipulate information, it does not require that the 
decision be conventional). 
 172. The four elements do not necessarily align into a hierarchy. See Berg et al., 
supra note 166, at 357–58 (explaining that missing any one of the elements may cause 
incapacitation depending on the circumstances). So the person who fails to evidence 
appreciation (for example, “I know gangrene is deadly, but I don’t believe my untreated 
gangrene will result in my death”), but does evidence reasoning skills (for example, “I 
prefer medical over surgical treatments since I have obligations to support my family that 
are not conducive to long recovery periods”) is not clearly more or less autonomous than 
the person who demonstrates the reverse capacities. However, compound application of 
standards are likely to fall into a hierarchy of stringency (for example, choice alone versus 
choice plus understanding versus choice plus understanding plus reasoning). See 
generally id. (discussing further this notion). 
 173. This Article will not discuss constructing competence standards for different 
decisions in detail. For additional discussion, see id. at 375–90 (discussing the application 
of these components to formulate competence standards). 
 174. See id. at 384–87 (debating whether the degree of competence should be 
determined by a fixed level of performance or a sliding scale). 
 175. 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (holding that the competence standard required for pleading 
guilty or waiving the right to counsel is not higher than the competence level required to 
stand trial). 
 176. Id. at 391. 
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thus the individual in question must demonstrate the same 
capacity to waive trial as to stand for trial.177 But even if we apply 
the same standard (for example, understanding and 
appreciation), the actual requirements may be lower in the sense 
that the information in question is simply easier to understand 
or appreciate. For example, a defendant who waives his right to 
trial does not need to understand the intricacies of trial, or be 
able to assist counsel in preparing and conducting the trial, but 
merely needs to understand that he has a right to a trial on the 
facts of the case and that his plea of guilty gives up that right.178 
The end result is to make it easier for an individual of dubious 
capacity to waive a right than to exercise it. 
Moreover, in some situations, we might be less concerned 
about the harm of letting someone waive a right than the harm of 
having him exercise it in a non-autonomous way, particularly 
when the waiver results in a transfer of decisionmaking 
authority to another party. Allowing waiver in this context has 
an end result of allowing even a possibly incapacitated individual 
to control, at least to a certain degree, what happens to him—
here, deciding to grant decisionmaking authority to another 
person.179 This, in itself, might be a good that we want to 
encourage. For example, waivers of an individual’s right to make 
decisions by transferring authority to a fiduciary may be best 
thought of as “delegations.”180 Accepting the individual’s waiver 
                                                          
 177. See, e.g., James F. Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., Apr. 1985, at 18–21 (arguing for and describing a sliding scale of standards in 
medical situations which increases in rigor as the consequences flowing from 
decisionmaking become more serious). 
 178. See generally Dix, supra note 2, at 260–61 (recognizing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s suggestion of a distinction between competence to waive assistance of counsel and 
competence to stand trial). 
 179. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 808 (explaining that in a 
fiduciary relationship a person can grant authority for someone to act as his substitute in 
areas he may not be capable or competent to make his own decisions). 
 180. “Fiduciary” is a term used to describe a particular relationship between two 
parties that gives rise to certain legal duties including “good faith, trust, confidence, and 
candor.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (7th ed. 1999). Fiduciaries include agents, 
partners, directors and officers, trustees, executors and administrators, receivers, bailees, 
guardians, and some professionals such as attorneys or physicians. See, e.g., Frankel, 
Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 795–96, 816. Fiduciary relationships are generally 
marked by power differentials with the entrusting party (“entrustor”) being dependent on 
the fiduciary. See id. at 809. In almost all situations, a fiduciary relationship must be 
entered into voluntarily. Id. at 801. The entrustor makes a decision to transfer 
decisionmaking authority within a defined scope to the fiduciary—in essence a waiver of 
autonomy. See id. at 808 (observing that the fiduciary effectively acts as a substitute for 
the entrustor). But the waiver in this case does not simply entail giving up the right in 
question, rather it involves a delegation of decisionmaking authority to a recognized 
expert (and the delegation is because of that expertise). See id. at 809. Because there are 
often both knowledge and skill differentials between the fiduciary and the entrustor, it is 
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allows that exercise of autonomy (the choice to have someone else 
make the decision) to be respected. In fact, the legal obligations 
imposed on fiduciaries are essentially descriptive autonomy 
protections.181 Transfer of decisionmaking authority to an expert 
through a fiduciary relationship allows an individual to exercise 
autonomy, both by allowing the transfer and by ensuring that 
decisions are made in light of the individual’s wants and 
preferences—basically a proxy for autonomy.182 For delegations to 
fiduciaries, or other situations where there are safeguards (legal 
or ethical duties required of one of the actors) in place, we might 
be comfortable accepting a waiver from individuals who 
demonstrate minimal capacity—say a basic understanding that 
they hold the right in question and that their action results in 
waiving the right. The result is requiring a lower level of capacity 
to waive a right than to exercise the right.183 For example, the 
                                                          
difficult, if not impossible, for the entrustor to monitor all aspects of the fiduciary’s 
actions. See id. at 813. As a result, the law imposes certain duties on the fiduciary to 
protect the more vulnerable entrusting party. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary 
Contracting Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 
U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 389–93 (1990) (discussing the disclosures that are necessary in a 
fiduciary doctor-patient relationship). In all situations, courts require the “fiduciary to act 
with loyalty and skill, in the entrustor’s best interests.” Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra 
note 10, at 823; see also Mehlman, supra, at 390 (stating that “[f]iduciary law obligates 
the better-informed provider to act in the patient’s best interests”). The entrustor can 
define her best interests in particular ways (and thus direct the fiduciary to take certain 
actions), but the entrustor cannot waive the fiduciary’s obligation to act in her best 
interests. See Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 821, 823–24. 
 181. One of the primary obligations of fiduciaries is disclosure, thus facilitating 
knowledge and consequently autonomous decisionmaking. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 
180, at 390–91. 
 182. See, e.g., Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. 
L. REV. 303, 350–51 (1999) (arguing that fiduciary relationships promote freedom in the 
sense that the fiduciary functions as an “extension” of the entrustor). The limitation on 
waiver of certain fiduciary obligations is a recognition that it may be impossible in certain 
circumstances to evaluate whether the entrustor’s decision was autonomous. Mehlman, 
supra note 180, at 395–96 (identifying obstacles which may lessen the ability of a patient 
to make an informed decision). Refer to notes 43, 86, 88 supra and accompanying text. 
Thus, not only will disclosure be required, but the fiduciary may need to evaluate capacity 
and knowledge and, furthermore, will bear the burden of proving both if the decision in 
question is challenged in a court of law. One element that is “unwaivable” is court 
supervision over the fiduciary. Frankel, Fiduciary Law, supra note 10, at 821. 
 183. Conversely, we might require a fairly high standard of capacity when the 
consequences are unusually severe. Consider the judge’s need to act as a teacher as well 
as judge in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who waived his right to legal representation 
and is defending himself in the September 11 terrorist trial. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, 
Defendant in Sept. 11 Plot Accuses Judge of Trickery, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2002, at A18 
(commenting that Judge Brikema had to explain the meaning of a plea of “no contest” to 
Moussaoui to protect him from inadvertently pleading guilty). This might have been a 
situation in which a higher level of capacity should have been applied, restricting 
Moussaoui’s ability to decline legal representation. In fact, the judge in the case required 
the previously court-appointed lawyers to remain on “standby” in case she determined 
that Moussaoui could no longer defend himself. Id. 
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capacity needed to enact a health care power of attorney may be 
much lower than the capacity needed actually to make the health 
care decisions. In the former situation, the individual need only 
demonstrate that he understands his right to make health care 
decisions and that he is granting another person the authority to 
make those decisions for him. In the latter situation, he may 
need to demonstrate appreciation and reasoning skills along with 
basic understanding of the situation. 
A legislature or court may have to determine what level of 
capacity is required to exercise a waiver and how the standard 
will be applied.184 Determining this requirement should entail 
evaluation of the implications of the waiver. This evaluation 
includes considering the seriousness of the consequences that 
may flow from the waiver, as well as whether the waiver entails 
a transfer of decisionmaking authority to another individual. In 
the latter situation, if there are protections in place to assure 
that the recipient of the decisionmaking authority is obligated to 
promote the individual’s wants and preferences (autonomy) or, 
when this is not feasible, promote the individual’s best interests, 
a lower capacity requirement will be appropriate. 
C. Disclosure and Other Safeguards 
Although there are genuine issues regarding setting 
standards for evaluating voluntariness and intention, the real 
focus in most situations is on determining how to measure the 
level of autonomy at issue, and that translates into the question: 
How much proof of autonomy will we require? We do not require 
individuals to prove their autonomy in the abstract; rather we 
scrutinize certain decisions. This question can be rephrased as 
whether specific requirements (“safeguards”) should be applied 
around the decisionmaking process. Such safeguards include 
tests for determining whether the individual actually has, and 
demonstrates, the capacity and knowledge for intentional action. 
Which safeguards to apply depends on the level of autonomy at 
issue.185 Arguably, any interference with individual 
                                                          
 184. Setting standards for capacity is probably one of the least understood and 
analyzed areas of law. See, e.g., Berg et. al, supra note 166, at 347–48 (stating that 
“[c]ases and statutes generally lack sufficient analysis of competence and its different 
elements” and relevant terms “may be poorly defined and used indiscriminately”). 
 185. Mill uses the example of freedom of thought and opinion. See Mill, supra note 
21, at 50 (stating that liberty “comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; 
demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and 
feeling; absolute freedom of opinion of sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, 
scientific, moral or theological”). Thought is most closely linked to personal identity, and 
thus most closely approximates the notion of autonomy. Id. Mill adds to this first aspect, 
(2)BERGG1.DOC 5/28/2003 6:31 PM 
320 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [40:2 
                                                          
freedom to frame one’s own life pursuit, as well as freedom to associate with whom one 
wants. Id. 
Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the 
plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such 
consequences as may follow: without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so 
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they should think our 
conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly from this liberty of each individual, 
follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; 
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others. 
Id.  
  Current judicial protections of autonomy encompass privacy in the sense of 
personal information and personal space, along with freedom to make certain kinds of 
decisions about one’s life. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, supra note 19, at 197–
98. But the Court, in affording certain protections to autonomous decisionmaking, has 
clearly limited the notion of freedom to develop individual intellect and emotion to those 
decisions within traditionally private realms and, in some cases, to only those choices that 
are themselves considered “traditional.” See id. at 197–99. Decisions regarding marital 
privacy and whether to bear or beget a child are considered traditionally private, and thus 
considered closely related to autonomy. See id. at 197–98. Likewise, Professor Smith 
points out that the standards in both the Fourth Amendment and the First Amendment 
context have also been linked to traditional social expectations and conventions. Id. at 
197–99. But as he correctly states, there are a number of problems with the Court’s 
approach, including the following: (1) “the appeal to social morality is difficult to 
implement, and therefore unpredictable,” and (2) “if sincerely applied, it seems likely to 
undercut the Court’s role in opposing conventional prejudices and protecting minorities.” 
Id. at 201–02. 
  The Supreme Court’s recent determinations that physician-assisted suicide is 
not part of the notion of liberty or autonomy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause are evidence of the first problem, as current tradition (the last twenty 
years), at least arguably, encompasses the right of patients to determine the time and 
manner of their death. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 804–10 (1997) (holding that 
a state ban on physician assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because there is a distinction between refusing life-sustaining treatment and suicide); id. 
at 809–10 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that “assisted suicide is [not] a 
fundamental right entitled to recognition at this time” under the due process standard); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728, 735 (1997) (holding that a state ban on 
assisted suicide did not violate the Due Process Clause because it is not a fundamental 
liberty interest and is rationally related to governmental interests). Yet the Court, 
reaching back over the past century or more, concluded that within that larger time 
frame, traditionally, suicide has been impermissible. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710–19. 
Thus part of the problem appears to rest on appropriately identifying the time-relevant 
tradition. The second concern is of greater scale since it raises significant questions about 
the role of courts as guardians of individual rights against majority rule. Tradition is most 
easily defined as those practices embraced by the majority over time. See id. at 710–16 
(evaluating “tradition” by examining the practices in other states and democracies over 
hundreds of years). But if protections for individual autonomy are to mean anything, they 
must accommodate varying practices among vastly different people. Thus limiting 
autonomy protections to those practices or decisions that are deemed “traditional” seems 
to undermine the basic goal of allowing individuals to develop in their own unique way. 
  Rather than jettison autonomy or liberal theory as a unifying framework, 
Professor Smith proposes three alternatives. See Smith, Constitution and Autonomy, 
supra note 19, at 203–04. The first is to accept a theoretical process under which 
individuals jointly define the limits of freedom. Id. at 204 (commenting that this may 
create “standards that the bulk of the modern American community would accept on 
reflection”). He cites John Rawls and Professor Bruce Ackerman (who advocates deciding 
“between competing standards by imagining the results of dialogues between their 
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decisionmaking will infringe upon autonomy, at least the 
minimal level of autonomy inherent in any voluntary action.186 If 
the issue is maximizing autonomy, infringements should only be 
tolerated when the autonomy at stake is great enough to justify 
additional scrutiny of the individual’s decision. Moreover, 
imposition of a safeguard should increase autonomy.187 Given the 
presumption in favor of allowing individual waivers as 
autonomous acts and the difficulty in actually measuring the 
autonomy at stake in particular cases, the question is: Are the 
consequences of a potential non-autonomous waiver significant 
enough to justify imposing safeguards around the waiver 
process? 
                                                          
adherents, subject to certain constraints”). Id. Professor Smith stresses that a problem 
with this approach is that it does not deal with those people who would refuse to accept 
Rawls’s original position or Professor Ackerman’s initial constraints. Id. The second 
alternative is to define autonomy in a limited manner. Id. However, Professor Smith 
notes that such a position is likely to be incompatible with the two premises of autonomy: 
“first, that one’s unique nature provides the highest standards for one’s actions, and 
second, that one’s nature is best known to one’s self.” Id. (footnote omitted). And the third 
alternative is to link the notion of autonomy to the early liberal conception of individual 
liberty. Id. at 205 (noting that such an approach suffers from all of the problems 
previously identified, including how the notion of autonomy is compatible with such limits 
as “rationality”). Although he does not go into a detailed analysis, Smith clearly favors the 
first option. Id. at 204 (referring to it as the “most attractive” approach). The alternative 
formulations for defining autonomy seem incompatible with the underlying concept. Id. at 
204–05 (questioning the feasibility of the last two proposed approaches to autonomy). 
Moreover, there is considerable appeal in defining the limits of autonomy using a type of 
“consent” theory, because it seems most respectful of individual freedom in the first place. 
 186. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 14, at 1486 (noting that when a right protects 
autonomy, scrutiny of the reasons for waiving the right is “inconsistent with protecting 
individual sovereignty over the decision”); see also Garnett, supra note 87, at 487–89 
(highlighting the inconsistency of both relying on a justifying notion of consent out of 
respect for autonomy, and scrutinizing individual consent to determine whether it meets 
some subjectively determined standard of rationality). Garnett uses the example of 
consent to human experimentation and argues that either individuals should be able to 
consent to any experimentation (full respect for autonomy), or there should be some 
experiments that are impermissible regardless of consent (acknowledging other values 
beyond autonomy). Id. at 489–90. Professor Garnett supports the latter position. Id. at 
511 (concluding that “we must place objective limits on what we permit ourselves to do to 
each other”). 
 187. See, e.g., Matthew S. Ferguson, Ethical Postures of Futility and California’s 
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1249 (2002) (observing that a 
judge may consider whether statutorily imposed safeguards promote a patient’s 
autonomy). If our goal is maximizing autonomy, then we must apply rules that result in 
an overall increase of autonomy. However, it is important to recognize that the weighing 
cannot occur on a case-by-case basis. That is, we cannot justify extreme limits on one 
person’s autonomy because it would increase the autonomy of other people. Nor is it 
appropriate to reverse the situation and allow an individual to opt-out of a safeguard in 
order to increase his own autonomy. The rules in question must be ones that individuals 
would agree to ahead of time because they result in overall maximization of everyone’s 
autonomy, even if this entails limiting autonomy in certain cases. 
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For decisions with relatively minor implications—for 
example, whether or not to hire one lawyer versus another188—we 
do not actually evaluate the autonomy of the decision to hire one 
attorney in lieu of another. In contrast, we require increased 
safeguards—perhaps requiring a judge’s or health professional’s 
explicit evaluation of autonomy—for decisions to represent 
oneself at trial.189 We require different levels of proof or different 
protections of autonomy depending on the circumstances. For 
example, waivers of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in the Miranda context require that law 
enforcement inform the individual that he has a right to remain 
silent, that if he says anything it can be used against him in a 
criminal proceeding, and that he has a right to counsel.190 
Alternatively, we might proceed further and require that in 
addition to disclosure, someone test understanding by asking the 
individual questions based on the information. Thus, waivers of 
the Sixth Amendment right to trial require the judge to inquire 
into whether the defendant understands that, by entering a plea 
of guilty, a sentence will be imposed.191 
The most basic safeguards relate to disclosure requirements. 
In a variety of settings, the Supreme Court has held that 
individuals must know they have a particular right before they 
can waive that right.192 When the consequences of a potentially 
                                                          
 188. Of course, there may be significant implications of hiring different lawyers, due 
to varying skill levels. Although we may not provide a priori safeguards to ensure 
autonomous choice between lawyers, the system does have mechanisms to appeal 
decisions based on attorney incompetence, as well as avenues to recover financially from 
an inept lawyer through malpractice suits. See Richard Klein, Legal Malpractice, 
Professional Discipline, and Representation of the Indigent Defendant, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 
1171, 1202–05 (1988) (discussing available remedies for poor representation). 
 189. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975) (holding that when the 
defendant is found to be literate, competent, understanding, and voluntarily exercising 
informed free will, a court cannot require representation by a lawyer). 
 190. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966). 
 191. Waivers of the Sixth Amendment right to trial, by entry of a guilty plea, require 
a judge to explain the nature of the charges, the consequences of a conviction, and that by 
pleading guilty the defendant waives his right to a trial. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (providing 
that a court must determine the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the 
maximum and minimum sentences, the right to representation by attorney, and the right 
to plea not guilty). The consequences of a conviction include any applicable minimum 
sentence and the maximum possible sentence the defendant may receive. Id.; James J. 
Gildea, Guilty Pleas, 72 GEO. L.J. 477, 483–485 (1983). 
 192. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (stating that waiver “is 
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” 
and that ignorance of the right to counsel makes the waiver invalid). Knowledge 
requirements are not limited to criminal law—there are disclosure requirements in 
contract law contexts as well. See, e.g., 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 656 (2002) (noting 
that waivers are not effectual unless made with knowledge of the circumstances); Richard 
B. Malamud & John E. Karayan, Contractual Waivers for Minors in Sports-Related 
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non-autonomous waiver are minor, this knowledge might be 
presumed, or at least no additional safeguards will be put in 
place to assess knowledge. Thus, Fourth Amendment waivers in 
consent searches are not explicitly required to be knowing.193 By 
contrast, in some settings the concern will be greater, and thus 
specific safeguards will be put in place. For example, Miranda 
warnings are designed to inform defendants of their rights under 
the Fifth Amendment.194 
In contrast to the voluntariness prong of waivers, which is 
generally dealt with on a post hoc basis,195 the intention prong 
may be addressed through a priori safeguards.196 Whether to 
apply such safeguards, which include tests of individual capacity 
or disclosure requirements, depends on the seriousness of the 
consequences that flow from a non-autonomous waiver. In other 
words, if we assume that individual waivers deserve deference 
and that attempts to determine the autonomy of a particular 
waiver involve state interference with individual decisionmaking, 
then governmental restrictions on waivers should only be 
imposed when the risks of allowing a non-autonomous waiver 
outweigh the impositions on individual autonomy.197 These 
                                                          
Activities, 2 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 151, 160 (1992) (discussing knowledge requirements with 
respect to disclosure of the waiver provision); Georgette C. Poindexter, Estopped in the 
Name of Waiver: The Role of Waiver and Estoppel in Commercial Leasing, 25 REAL EST. 
L.J. 267, 268–69 (1997) (stating that knowledge of the existence of the right is required 
for waiver of contractual rights under a lease); Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for 
Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 
65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 460 (1997) (discussing knowledge requirements for 
contractual waivers of jury trials). 
 193. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While knowledge of the 
right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not 
establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent.”). This situation is 
probably not a case where knowledge is presumed, but no additional safeguards are put in 
place. Refer to Part III.B supra. 
 194. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege . . . serves to protect 
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any 
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves . . . . In order to 
combat [the pressures of interrogation] and to permit a free opportunity to 
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately 
and effectively apprised of his rights . . . . 
Id. 
 195. But refer to note 151 supra and accompanying text. 
 196. Of course, the first time a court decides a case, the safeguards will not have 
been put in place. Thus, the Miranda warnings arose out of a case questioning whether 
police had to warn suspects. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439–42. Prior to the landmark decision, 
there were no judicially required knowledge safeguards. See id. at 440–42. 
 197. In contrast, in the criminal procedure context, Professor Spritzer argues that 
safeguards should be applied in all cases to assure capable and knowing waivers, and only 
when safeguards prove infeasible or too costly should system considerations be taken into 
account. Spritzer, supra note 2, at 514. He specifically finds fault with the lack of 
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determinations will depend on an analysis of the descriptive 
autonomy right or protection in question and the secondary goals 
of the system. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this Article, autonomy is 
a beginning point of analysis.198 It best explains why there are 
different limitations on waivers and why the specific 
requirements for a valid waiver exist.199 But even if we assume 
that the overall goal is to promote autonomy, there may be 
disagreement about the means of achieving that goal. For 
example, an efficiency approach would say that creating rules 
that lead to the most efficient system will result in the most 
overall autonomy, otherwise governmental interference with 
individuals will be allowed to a greater extent than necessary.200 
Alternatively, a distributive justice approach will be concerned 
with the distributive (or non-distributive) effects of particular 
rules, arguing that equality of treatment is crucial for 
maximizing autonomy.201 So, an analysis of the consequences of a 
potential non-autonomous waiver requires consideration of what 
measurements will be used to evaluate those consequences.202 In 
this sense, an autonomy analysis does not so much displace other 
theories, as it provides an overarching framework to situate 
disparate approaches. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
The previous sections of this Article have laid the foundation 
for evaluating waivers. The Article argues that the framework 
described above functions both descriptively and normatively. 
Although there may be additional reasons justifying the 
outcomes of the cases described, the autonomy framework 
provides the best basis for analysis.203 Moreover, it is one that 
                                                          
safeguards in the Fourth Amendment context. Id. His argument reverses the general 
presumption under an autonomy framework that government interference with 
individual decisionmaking is inappropriate. Refer to note 19 supra and accompanying text 
(discussing governmental interference on individual autonomy). 
 198. Refer to notes 19–27 supra and accompanying text (discussing the implications 
of autonomy). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Refer to notes 16–18 supra and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency 
rationale). 
 201. See C.M.A. McCauliff, A Historical Approach to the Contractual Ties that Bind 
Parties Together, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 861 (2002) (discussing “the Aristotelian notion 
of distributive justice,” which corrects harm resulting from a disequilibrium in the 
relationship). 
 202. The analysis will also depend on what the system’s secondary goals are. Refer to 
Part IV.A infra. 
 203. Refer to notes 19–27 supra and accompanying text. 
(2)BERGG1.DOC 5/28/2003 6:31 PM 
2003] UNDERSTANDING WAIVER 325 
reflects factors the courts actually do and should apply in 
analyzing waivers. Abstract formulations are always limited, so 
to elucidate the step-by-step analysis, the following subsections 
apply the theory to examples. The first part of this section, 
addressing waiver of informed consent for medical care, tests the 
application of the theory to a novel case, which will be examined 
in detail. The second part looks at two areas—waivers of Fourth 
Amendment rights via consent to search and waivers of statutory 
protections via contract. 
Before delving into the examples, it is worth reiterating the 
steps a court should take in determining whether to honor a 
party’s decision to waive a particular right. The presumption in 
all cases is that a waiver is valid, so the question is whether, in 
the specific case, the waiver should be limited or safeguards 
should be applied around the waiver process to assure a valid 
waiver. The first step a court should undertake in evaluating a 
waiver is to consider whether there are any system or ascriptive 
autonomy reasons for limiting the waiver.204 Notably, few waivers 
will be restricted on these grounds. The second step is to 
determine whether the waiver may be considered valid based on 
the descriptive autonomy analysis described above.205 The 
examples below involve descriptive autonomy protections. 
Recall that there are four reasons why a waiver of a 
descriptive autonomy protection could be restricted: (1) the rule 
must be applied in all cases in order to function as an 
appropriate protection of autonomy; (2) waivers could never be 
autonomous given the power differentials in the context; (3) it 
would be impossible or too costly to establish in each case that 
the waiver lacked autonomy; or (4) in the particular case, the 
waiver is invalid because it failed either the voluntariness or 
intention requirements.206 There are few areas in which we limit 
waivers based on either requirements that a rule be applied in all 
cases or prior assumptions about the absence of autonomy in all 
cases. The third rationale—limiting waivers because of the cost 
or burden associated with determining autonomy on a case-by-
case basis—is more plausible, and thus courts should seriously 
consider whether a situation is one in which such concerns 
function to restrict waivers. When the balance does not favor an 
across-the-board limitation of waiver for any of the first three 
reasons, the court should focus on the specific waiver at issue and 
determine whether it meets the requirements for voluntariness 
                                                          
 204. Refer to Part II.C supra. 
 205. Refer to Part III.A–B supra. 
 206. Refer to note 88 supra and accompanying text. 
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and intention. With respect to voluntariness, the inquiry entails 
consideration of whether improper (unfair) coercion deprived the 
individual’s decision of the force it would otherwise have.207 Both 
the source of the pressure and the type of pressure will be 
relevant, and different standards may apply depending on the 
type of waiver in question and our general societal notions of 
fairness in different contexts. For example, compare the role of 
governmental pressure in the criminal procedure context to 
concerns about private pressure in the contract context.208 With 
respect to intention, the court must consider whether the 
autonomy given up as part of the waiver is significant enough to 
trigger safeguards to assess capacity and to assure knowledge, 
rather than simply assume a capable and informed 
decisionmaker. This analysis will entail an evaluation of the 
consequences of a waiver. The following three examples will 
demonstrate how this framework should be applied. 
A. Waiver of Informed Consent to Make Medical Decisions209 
There are a number of reasons for choosing this example to 
develop in more detail. First, although little attention has been 
paid to waiver requirements generally, some theoretical work has 
been done in this area.210 Second, issues of waiver of informed 
                                                          
 207. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 88 (noting that “inducements, persuasion, 
and authority are all forms of pressure that may be considered coercive in certain 
circumstances, depending on individual perception,” but that doctors should nonetheless 
“feel comfortable advocating for a particular treatment option and attempting to convince 
a patient to exercise his decisionmaking rights to consent”). 
 208. Refer to notes 147–50 supra and accompanying text (discussing waivers in 
criminal procedure and contract law). 
 209. These comments do not apply to waivers of informed consent for research 
participation. First, the term is generally used in that context to refer to “waivers” 
permitted by independent research boards for research in emergency situations, not to 
individual waivers—arguably not a situation of waiver at all, at least under this Article’s 
definition. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between 
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 390–91 (2002) (discussing 
the FDA’s regulations pertaining to experimental treatment). Second, the concerns with 
allowing a non-autonomous waiver in the research context are likely to be greater than 
those in the treatment context, and thus, the balance may come out differently under the 
autonomy framework. Id. at 390–92. 
 210. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85–90. Although the notion of waiver of 
informed consent is not new, the contours of the legal doctrine remain undefined. Id. at 
85. A few cases acknowledge that there are limits to informed consent, but fail to explain 
important problems of definition and application. Id.; see Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 
(Cal. 1972) (“The scope of the physician’s communications to the patient . . . must be 
measured by the patient’s need, and that need is whatever information is material to the 
decision.”); Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) 
(reasoning that when a doctor’s “attempts at explanation [are] prevented by [the] patient’s 
insistence on remaining ignorant of the risks involved,” the patient cannot later complain 
that “consent to the procedure was not an informed one”); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of 
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consent in this context are particularly timely.211 For example, 
waiver has recently been proffered as a solution for some 
problems involving health care services. One proponent suggests 
that patients may contractually “waive” their right to receive 
certain treatments, or information about those treatments, in 
exchange for paying lower insurance premiums.212 Waiver of 
informed consent seems intuitively permissible because the idea 
behind the doctrine of informed consent is to allow patients to 
control what happens to them and control over participation in 
decisionmaking is a crucial element of waiver.213 Moreover, it is 
difficult to conceive how one would “force” informed consent on 
an unwilling patient. Nonetheless, not all commentators agree 
that waiver of informed consent should be permitted.214 The 
uneasiness with the concept seems to stem as much from the 
uncertainty surrounding application of the informed consent 
doctrine as from fundamental disagreement regarding the 
concept of waiver itself. Without further exploration of waivers in 
general, and informed consent waivers specifically, proposals, 
like the one regarding waiver of information in exchange for 
lower insurance premiums, are difficult to evaluate. 
In addition, informed consent protections are an obvious 
example of protections put in place to increase descriptive 
autonomy. Although the idea that individuals have an inherent 
right to control what happens to their bodies, including what 
medical care to receive, it is also linked to an ascriptive notion of 
autonomy;215 the disclosure obligations placed upon health care 
                                                          
Mental Health, No. 73-19434-AW (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne County July 10, 1973), reprinted 
in 1 Mental Disability L. Rptr. 147, 149 (1976) (“Generally, individuals are allowed free 
choice about whether to undergo experimental medical procedures. But the State has the 
power to modify this free choice concerning experimental procedures when it cannot be 
freely given, or when the result would be contrary to public policy.”); Holt v. Nelson, 523 
P.2d 211, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (noting that when considering whether a patient’s 
consent was informed, the necessary “causal connection exists when, but only when, 
disclosure of significant risks incidental to treatment would have resulted in a decision 
against [treatment]”). 
 211. I initially became interested in the topic of waivers because of my work in the 
area of informed consent. Working on the assumption that it is best to develop and apply 
a new legal theory (here of waiver) in an area in which one has some expertise, informed 
consent seemed the logical place to begin! 
 212. Hall, supra note 2, at 566–69; see also Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing 
Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 351–
62 (1997) (critiquing Hall’s suggestion). 
 213. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85. 
 214. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 122–24 (1984) 
(arguing that informed consent should not be waived). 
 215. See, e.g., Samuel Hellman & Deborah S. Hellman, Of Mice but Not Men: 
Problems of the Randomized Clinical Trial, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1585, 1587 (1991) 
(“The right to be treated as an individual deserving the physician’s best judgment and 
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professionals illustrate a recognition that increased information 
leads to greater autonomy.216 Thus, informed consent 
requirements help to assure autonomous decisionmaking and to 
promote autonomy in a descriptive sense. 
Analysis of waiver of informed consent provides an 
opportunity to consider waiver of descriptive autonomy 
protections. Recall that there are four bases for limiting waivers 
of descriptive autonomy protections, three of which justify across-
the-board restrictions.217 These three are based on a 
determination that the waiver: (1) would undermine the 
application of a rule generally, thus affecting other’s autonomy; 
(2) could never be autonomous; or (3) could never be proven to be 
autonomous.218 Allowing individual patients to choose how 
involved they will be in their medical decisions will not 
undermine either the medical care system as a whole, nor the 
informed consent doctrine specifically. Although there may be 
some concern that widespread use of waiver in the informed 
consent context could dissuade physicians from sharing 
information,219 this is unlikely to be the case both because 
waivers of informed consent will not be prevalent220 and because 
                                                          
care, rather than be used as a means to [an end] . . . is inherent in every person. This 
right, based on the concept of dignity, cannot be waived.”). 
 216. Informed consent is a rule designed to protect an individual’s right to bodily 
integrity (a notion closely linked with autonomy). See Heinrich ex rel. Heinrich v. Sweet, 
62 F. Supp. 2d 282, 312–13 (D. Mass. 1999) (noting that three other district courts, in 
“well-reasoned opinions,” ruled that the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandate against invasion 
of bodily integrity includes the right to consent). The constitutional dimensions of a right 
to make medical decisions are not entirely clear, but the Supreme Court has supported 
such a right in two lines of jurisprudence—abortion cases and refusal of treatment cases. 
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that “the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter” involves “the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy” and are therefore “central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269–70 (1990) (“The 
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possesses 
the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”). In both areas the Court has 
repeatedly stressed that the Constitution creates a sphere of privacy, drawn primarily 
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, within which we can ground an 
individual’s right to make decisions concerning her medical care. See, e.g., Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“In a long line of cases, we have held that, in 
addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the liberty specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights . . . to bodily integrity . . . . We 
have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due Process Clause protects the 
traditional right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment.”). 
 217. Refer to notes 87–88 supra and accompanying text. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 69, 86 (1994). 
 220. Waivers are not likely to be prevalent in light of the fact that most patients 
want to participate in decisionmaking. See Krause, supra note 212, at 305 (describing 
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other protections continue to push physicians towards disclosure 
and encourage patient involvement in decisionmaking.221 
Moreover, although fiduciary protections are put in place because 
of concerns about the knowledge differentials between doctor and 
patient, informed consent is not a situation in which it would be 
impossible in all cases to have an autonomous waiver decision. 
Furthermore, determining autonomy within the context of a 
waiver of informed consent is similar to determining autonomy 
within the context of an informed consent decision itself—
something physicians are already required to do—and thus it is 
neither too difficult nor too costly to require case-by-case 
analysis. As a result, informed consent waivers should be 
examined for validity in light of the circumstances of each 
situation.222 
The first part of the analysis of validity focuses on 
voluntariness. For most procedures, and in the absence of 
obvious coercion (for example, physical force or threats), we 
should accept a patient’s waiver at face value. In fact, this is 
what occurs when a patient makes the treatment decision 
herself; the voluntariness of the treatment choice is presumed, 
absent any indication of improper coercion. Moreover, as 
previously noted, voluntariness is best evaluated post hoc 
because, apart from a doctor’s professional ethical obligations to 
avoid pressuring patients, there are few safeguards against 
coercion. Likewise, we are generally unconcerned with pressures 
from family members because we assume familial obligations will 
provide appropriate limits.223 However, we do require that 
                                                          
informed consent as being grounded on the concept that “when there are several 
appropriate treatment options for a condition . . . (patients) want to be able to choose for 
themselves which one to receive” (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Charles Sabatino, Legislative Trends in Health-Care Decisionmaking, ABA 
BIOETHICS BULL., Summer 1994, at 10 (reporting that “[t]he consumer movement in 
health care continues to champion patient autonomy and choice”). 
 221. For example, ethical standards require that physicians disclose information and 
include patients in decisionmaking. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, 
opinion 8.08, at 165 (2000). 
 222. See generally Mehlman, supra note 180, at 415–16 (arguing that patient 
decisions to waive information disclosures in the informed consent context should “only be 
upheld if they represent[] the patient’s direct, voluntary and informed choice at the time 
they were entered into”). There has been some debate about the characterization of 
fiduciary duties and whether they can be waived under contract law principles. See, e.g., 
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1211–12 (1995) 
(arguing that waiver should be allowed, as long as entrustors are put on clear notice and 
the fiduciaries provide information to enable the entrustor to make an informed decision 
to waive). 
 223. Moreover, it is not clear that pressure from family members (other than threats 
of force) should even be considered improper pressures such that the resulting waiver is 
deemed coerced. In fact, these transfers work similarly to transfers to fiduciaries because 
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physicians, in their fiduciary role, at least reassure themselves 
that the patient’s request to waive informed consent is 
voluntary.224 This requirement might entail a simple inquiry into 
the reasons for the waiver and whether there was any improper 
external pressure involved.225 
The second part of the analysis focuses on intent, 
considering applicable standards for patient capacity to make a 
waiver, and determining what, if any, safeguards should be put 
in place to assess capacity and assure knowledge. This Article 
will address each of these issues in turn. Initially, it is important 
to recognize that there are two elements of informed consent, 
disclosure and choice, and a patient may seek to waive either or 
both.226 Each possibility has different implications for evaluations 
of capacity and knowledge. 
1. Capacity227 
Patients who decide to waive the consent aspect but 
maintain that they want to receive all information are the 
easiest to deal with. Essentially the patient may be saying 
that she will acquiesce in whatever the physician’s final 
recommendation is, but that she wants to remain informed. 
One way to look at this is . . . [that] the patient [is] actually 
making a choice between treatments, but basing that choice 
on the physician’s recommendation[—in other words, the 
patient might be seen as ratifying the physician’s 
recommendation in advance]. Alternatively, the patient 
may want . . . a family member [to] make the decision. Here 
too, one might say that the patient is making the choice 
based on what the family member recommends.228 
                                                          
the family member who was granted decisionmaking authority would be required to 
choose a treatment based upon what the surrogate knows of the patient’s preferences, 
thus approximating an autonomous decision by the patient himself. BERG ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 110, 113. 
 224. Refer to notes 179–82 supra (discussing delegation to a fiduciary). 
 225. Of course, this analysis may address concerns about coercion stemming from 
family members, but it is less likely to address concerns about pressure from the 
physician herself. But, as noted previously, fiduciaries have fairly clear legal obligations 
to promote their patients’ interests, and this alone might serve to mitigate some fears 
regarding coercion. Id. 
 226. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 88–90 (discussing patients who decide to waive 
consent versus patients who decide to waive information). 
 227. Material for this and the following subsection was drawn, in part, from chapter 
four of Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical Practice. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, 
at 85–90. 
 228. Id. at 89 (emphasis omitted). 
[I]n both cases there may difficulty in documenting legally valid informed 
consent. A patient who waives her right to decide may not want to sign a consent 
form, and may not even want to be asked what her decision is in a particular 
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Letting a patient of dubious capacity shift decisionmaking 
authority to the physician or a family member (or any other 
proxy chosen by the patient)229 allows the patient to exercise some 
autonomy. Moreover, as noted previously, in situations where 
decisionmaking authority is delegated to a fiduciary, we may not 
require a high level of capacity.230 The analysis for delegation to a 
family member is similar. In the absence of capacity, 
decisionmaking authority usually shifts to the family based on 
the assumption that close family members are best able to 
determine what the patient would choose had he been competent 
(“substituted judgment”) or, in the absence of evidence of the 
patient’s preferences, are best able to determine what is in the 
patient’s best interests.231 Accordingly, a delegation to a family 
member in the informed consent context is as, if not more, 
appropriate as a delegation to a fiduciary (physician).232 Both 
serve to safeguard the patient’s interests because in each case, 
the proxy is required to make the decision in a manner that best 
respects the patient’s autonomy.233 Therefore, both should 
generally be allowed if the patient shows minimal capacity.234 
                                                          
case. These are things she may prefer to have handled by the person chosen to 
make the decision. But most healthcare proxies are designed to take effect only 
when a patient is incompetent. Thus it remains unclear whether a proxy would 
have legal authority to make decisions for a competent patient. In part this is an 
artifact of the surrogate statutes that are designed to allow designation of a 
proxy in anticipation of later incapacity, as opposed to traditional proxy statutes 
that permit immediate assumption of decisionmaking authority. An additional 
problem is that most of the statutes do not allow physicians to assume surrogate 
decisionmaking authority, and thus a waiver that essentially entails the patient 
saying “[c]hoose whichever treatment you think is best, doctor,” may not 
represent a valid transfer of decisionmaking authority. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 229. Id. at 112 (discussing possible choices for selecting a surrogate). 
 230. Id. at 87. 
 231. Id. at 113–16. 
 232. It is worth recognizing that most state surrogate decisionmaking statutes 
specifically restrict the physician, or other treating health care professional, from being 
designated as the decisionmaker. See Colleen M. O’Connor, Statutory Surrogate Consent 
Provisions: An Overview and Analysis, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 128, 
131 (1996) (noting that only six state statutes authorize a physician to serve as 
decisionmaker in the absence of an available surrogate). This is a technical legal problem 
and warrants further attention. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 90 (discussing waivers 
of informed consent). 
 233. Bart J. Collopy, The Moral Underpinning of the Proxy-Provider Relationship: 
Issues of Trust and Distrust, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 37, 37–38 (1999) (noting that “the 
proxy and physician are morally linked by a mutual commitment to the autonomy and 
well-being of the patient”). 
 234. For example, we might require the same standard of capacity as needed to 
designate a proxy, which is a lower standard than that required for actually making the 
decision. See, e.g., Greg A. Sachs et al., Ethical Aspects of Dementia Research: Informed 
Consent and Proxy Consent, 42 CLINICAL RES. 403, 410 (1994) (finding that a large 
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Similarly, a waiver of both disclosure and choice should be 
allowed in most situations as an appropriate transfer of 
decisionmaking authority.235 
[However,] [p]atients who waive the [right to receive 
information disclosure], but not decisionmaking authority, 
present . . . difficulties. . . . [A] patient who does not want to 
hear about the risks of treatment before [choosing an 
option] arguably is making an incompetent decision.236 
  On the other hand, compelling patients to receive 
information that they do not want would . . . deny self-
determination. The answer to this problem might lie in how 
much understanding is necessary to make a decision an 
effective demonstration of self-determination. One 
possibility is to allow patients to waive information 
[disclosure] . . . only if they are aware . . . of the nature of 
the information they are waiving. Thus, a patient who 
waives information about risks must be aware that the 
treatment in question involves risk, and perhaps even 
serious risk, but would be allowed to make a decision 
without knowing the exact nature of the risks.237 
                                                          
number of dementia patients had the capacity to designate a surrogate decisionmaker, 
even though they would have failed adequately to understand and make decisions about 
participation in a research protocol). 
 235. There may be some limits here, depending on the significance of the decision. 
We generally place additional restrictions on surrogate decisionmaking regarding end-of-
life decisions, such as withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., 
Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (holding that the states 
may require safeguards around surrogate decisionmaking involving life-sustaining 
treatment, including higher evidentiary standards). 
 236. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 89. From a practical standpoint it might be hard 
to distinguish these cases from those in which a patient just “tunes out” when risk 
information is disclosed and makes a decision without incorporating the information. 
Evaluation of whether the patient exercised the appropriate capacities in making the 
decision should help (for example, the patient who fails to indicate any understanding or 
appreciation of risks when questioned would fail to exercise the appropriate capacities), 
but it will not solve the problem in all cases. Id. at 87. The reality of informed consent is 
that patients may make incompetent decisions, but when those decisions are in accord 
with the recommendations of physicians, or in accord with the choices of most people, they 
are rarely scrutinized. See generally id. at 106–09 (discussing determinations of 
incompetence). While this does not provide ideal protections for autonomous 
decisionmaking, even scrutinizing a decision involves some imposition on autonomy, and 
thus we may want to limit such interference to cases where the outcome (decision) in 
question is one that raises particular concern. This is not to say that unusual decisions 
should not be respected—that is, after all, what respecting autonomy is about. But they 
may be subject to additional scrutiny. 
 237. Id. at 89–90. 
But unlike a waiver of a particular type of information, such as risk information, 
a wholesale waiver that included all information about a treatment, for example, 
the patient says “Just tell me the names of the treatments and I’ll pick one,” 
would not meet the [capacity] requirement. Physicians justifiably may be wary of 
relying on the patient’s choice under such circumstances. The solution in these 
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This is in accord with the notion described earlier that the 
issue in some waiver situations is not application of a different 
standard for capacity, but that the information in question is 
simply easier to grasp.238 Thus rather than understand in detail 
all of the risks of a particular treatment, the patient who waives 
risk information need only understand that risks are possible 
along with the magnitude of the risk, such as life threatening 
issues versus minor discomfort, and that she has a right to 
additional information regarding the risks. 
2. Disclosure and Safeguards. Decisions about medical 
treatment are closely linked to autonomy.239 The significant 
autonomy given up must be outweighed by an assurance that the 
waiver itself is autonomous.240 However, the consequences of a 
waiver of the right to informed consent are not as significant as 
situations where a right is given up completely. As pointed out, a 
waiver of consent authorization results in another party (either a 
fiduciary or family) making the decision. Both a fiduciary and 
other surrogates are legally required to make decisions in the 
patient’s interests, as the patient would have defined those 
interests.241 Moreover, waivers of information result in greater 
reliance on the physician’s recommendations. Assuming the 
                                                          
situations may be the same as the solution in the case where patients waive both 
information and decisionmaking authority. Ideally patients should be 
encouraged to identify a third party who can both receive information and make 
decisions. Again, we [might have] some of the problems outlined [above], since 
many state statutes are not set up to accommodate competent patients who want 
to transfer decisionmaking authority. But this is likely to be a technical problem 
only. Competent patients in these circumstances should be treated as patients 
who have some capacity, but not full capacity, to make the medical decision at 
hand. In these cases, patient assent rather than consent would be sought. The 
assent requirement allows the patient to participate in the decision, but enables 
the physician to receive legally valid consent from a fully informed third party. 
Id. at 90. 
 238. Refer to notes 175–78 supra and accompanying text. 
 239. It is also an area closely linked to deliberative autonomy. See, e.g., Ken Marcus 
Gatter, Protecting Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Consent and Deliberative 
Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 987–93 (1999) (applying Professor Fleming’s theory of “the 
capacity for a conception of the good” to informed consent for medical care). 
 240. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85 (explaining that “the waiver exception [to 
informed consent] is focused on promoting the same value as the doctrine of informed 
consent itself—autonomy”). 
 241. Using a substituted judgment standard essentially requires that the 
decisionmaker promote the patient’s interests, as the patient herself would have defined 
them, autonomously. BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 112–15 (discussing standards of 
surrogate decisionmaking). A best interests standard ensures that in the absence of 
evidence of what the patient would consider to be in her interests, an objective 
determination will be made of what most people in the situation in question would have 
wanted—again, hopefully, a rough approximation of what an autonomous person would 
have decided. Id. 
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protections inherent in the fiduciary relationship function as they 
should,242 the harms of allowing a potentially non-autonomous 
waiver should be minimal. 
Furthermore, disclosure safeguards in this context are less 
appropriate. A Miranda-type warning given at the beginning of 
an encounter, or the start of every informed consent disclosure, is 
not suitable. Physicians should be required specifically to inform 
patients of their right to make medical decisions only upon an 
indication from the patient that she would like to waive her right 
to participate.243 If physicians must explain to all patients their 
rights not to have information disclosed, there is a risk that 
patients might infer that they ought not to want information or 
that the physician does not want it disclosed.244 The patient-
physician relationship is not characterized by the same 
adversarial relationship as between a suspect and a policeman. 
Therefore, initial warning statements concerning individual 
rights are appropriate in the suspect-policeman relationship, but 
the same cannot be said about the patient-physician relationship. 
As a result, a physician should have no absolute obligation to 
inform a patient of her rights in an initial encounter, but may 
assume that the act of disclosing information and requesting 
patient consent (an obligation the physician already has) implies 
that a patient has the right to the information and to make a 
decision about treatment.245 However, when a patient expresses a 
desire not to participate in the decisionmaking process, a 
conditional obligation arises to inform the patient of her rights.246 
Moreover, upon informing a patient, the physician should also be 
                                                          
 242. There is certainly some question of whether the fiduciary protections do 
function appropriately in the patient-physician relationship, given the competing 
financial and other incentives that affect physician treatment recommendations. See, e.g., 
Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 
AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 399, 415 (1996) (describing the effect insurance incentive schemes 
have on physicians). 
 243. See BERG ET AL., supra note 19, at 85 (stating that “physicians should have no 
absolute obligation to inform patients of their rights in an initial encounter . . . . However, 
when patients express a desire not to participate in the decisionmaking process, a 
conditional obligation arises to inform them of their rights”). In practice, patients must be 
informed of the following: 
(1) physicians have a duty to disclose information to them about treatment, (2) 
[they] have a legal right to make decisions about treatment, (3) physicians 
cannot render treatment without their consent, and (4) the right of decision 
includes a right to consent to or to refuse treatment. Unless a particular patient 
is far more knowledgeable than most, [he or] she is unlikely to know all this 
without being told by the physician.  
Id. 
 244. See id. at 86. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
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required to test for patient comprehension of her rights to a 
minimal extent, perhaps by asking a few basic questions 
regarding the patient’s understanding of her right to obtain 
information and choose between treatments. 
3. Summary. In sum, waivers of informed consent to make 
medical decisions should be permissible in most individual 
treatment contexts. Moreover, given patients’ differing interests 
in both obtaining information and participating in 
decisionmaking, legal mechanisms to allow waivers should be 
developed. But waivers will not be appropriate under all 
circumstances because the autonomy given up as part of the 
waiver decision should be counterbalanced by the autonomy 
demonstrated by the waiver itself. The result may be that using 
the concept of waiver to solve current health care delivery crises, 
such as allowing “waivers” of information about certain 
treatments in exchange for paying lower insurance premiums,247 
are acceptable only when the appropriate balance is struck 
between the autonomy given up and the autonomy (validity) of 
the waiver. In many cases, this may be impossible to achieve.248 
B. Some Initial Thoughts About Application of the Framework to 
Other Areas of Law 
The autonomy framework proposed above may also provide 
valuable insight into waivers in a number of other areas of law. 
This part will briefly consider two examples of waivers—one from 
the criminal procedure area and one from the contracts area—
and examine whether the theory can explain the outcomes. These 
are discrete examples within criminal procedure and contract 
law, and a full analysis of waiver in these legal areas is not 
attempted. This part will demonstrate that the framework 
proposed works descriptively to explain the requirements for 
waiver and is normatively appropriate. I will leave it to others, 
better qualified, to examine the application of the framework in 
more detail. 
                                                          
 247. See Hall, supra note 2, at 556–57. 
 248. In his article arguing for allowing such waivers, Professor Hall stresses that 
changes to the current system are necessary before an “economic” theory of informed 
consent could be applied, and thus, waivers of this type would be allowed. Id. at 586. 
Moreover, Professor Hall notes that there may be some absolute limits of what kinds of 
information can be waived, depending on the seriousness of the consequences (for 
example, information regarding life-sustaining treatments). Id. at 584–85. 
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1. Waivers of Criminal Procedural Rights—Fourth 
Amendment Consent Searches.249 Much of the discussion of 
waivers has occurred in the criminal procedure context. This Part 
considers specific issues relating to waivers of Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights that are involved in consent searches. 
These are waivers of a currently functioning right to privacy, 
achieved by an individual’s consent to allow a search. I chose the 
Fourth Amendment context because, although the law is fairly 
settled in this area, the requirements for waiver remain a source 
of debate.250 The theory proposed here may help clear up some of 
the lingering confusion in this area. 
First, no system limitations exist to justify restrictions on 
consent search waivers. The language in the Fourth Amendment 
referring to “unreasonable searches and seizures”251 indicates that 
the system presumably accepts that searches will take place, but 
merely attempts to restrict those that are unreasonable. Individual 
waivers of privacy in this context (by consenting to searches) are 
thus completely compatible with a functioning system. Moreover, 
there are no reasons to restrict waivers based on ascriptive 
autonomy. The Fourth Amendment, although its inherent notions 
of bodily integrity has links to ascriptive autonomy, is intended (as 
are most criminal procedural rights) to remedy the imbalance of 
power between the state and individuals,252 and thus raises concerns 
about descriptive autonomy. In the absence of system or ascriptive 
limitations, the issue is whether there are descriptive autonomy 
reasons to disallow waivers, or to place particular safeguards 
around the waiver process. After considering the three reasons for 
across-the-board limitations of waivers of descriptive autonomy, we 
can discount them. This is not a situation where a restriction must 
be applied in all circumstances—consent in one case does not 
necessarily affect the autonomy of another individual to refuse 
consent in another case. Therefore, privacy protections can be 
waived by an individual without undermining privacy protections 
for all other individuals.253 
                                                          
 249. I will not address third-party consents. Professor Dix is correct in his assertion 
that these are not in fact waivers. See Dix, supra note 2, at 197 n.6. 
 250. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
211, 220–21 (2002) (describing the requirements for the waiver of Fourth Amendment 
rights as an “amorphous standard [that] has proven difficult for lower courts to 
implement”). 
 251. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 252. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and 
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1377 (2002) (“In adopting 
the [Fourth Amendment], the Framers of our Constitution were primarily concerned with 
limiting government power and discretion . . . .”). 
 253. To some extent, this reasoning may be too simplistic. The fact that one 
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Second, although obvious power differentials exist between 
law enforcement personnel and private citizens, autonomous 
waivers can occur in the criminal context. Moreover, this is not 
likely to be a situation where evaluations of the autonomy of 
waivers in each circumstance would be so costly as to preclude 
case-by-case determinations.254 So the issue reduces to an 
analysis of whether there should be specific safeguards 
concerning individual waivers. 
Unlike waivers in the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
context where Miranda warnings assure knowledge, consent 
searches are not explicitly required to be “knowingly.”255 The 
Court’s rationale seems to be based in part on a distinction 
between “those rights guaranteed to criminal defendant to insure 
. . . a fair trial and the Fourth Amendment protections which “are 
of a wholly different order.”256 The determination of whether to 
impose safeguards depends on evaluating the consequences of a 
potential non-autonomous wavier. The consequences of an unfair 
criminal proceeding (unfair because the defendant was unaware 
                                                          
passenger on a bus consents to a search might have implications on the degree to which 
any other passenger feels free to refuse. Such external pressures are not considered 
improper, nor should such concerns require an across-the-board restriction on waivers of 
privacy. 
 254. In fact, some might argue that the reverse is true—it would be too costly for the 
system to restrict waivers in this context. 
 255. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973). 
We hold only that when the subject of a search is not in custody and the State 
attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in 
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or 
implied. 
Id.  
 256. Id. at 241–42. It was also based on practical concerns with how such awareness 
would be assured. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996) (holding that it was 
“unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go 
before a consent to search may be deemed involuntary”). 
  The Court seems to believe that an arrestee is a more vulnerable individual, and 
thus in need of additional protections. Arguably, however, the individual confronted in the 
search situation may be more vulnerable because at least the arrestee is aware that the 
police are adversaries, whereas the individual confronted in a search situation may 
cooperate in the hopes of maintaining good will (or indicating innocence). If we assume 
that it is always a bad idea for a guilty person to consent to a search—but not always a 
bad idea to talk to the police—then you might think that consent by a guilty person must 
always be the product of coercion, and thus be involuntary. E-mail from Craig M. Bradley, 
Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, to Jessica Berg, Assistant 
Professor of Law and Bioethics, Case Western Reserve University Schools of Law and 
Medicine (July 16, 2002, 10:37 CST) (copy on file with the Houston Law Review). Because 
I argue here that voluntariness is a matter of determining which pressures we (society) 
will determine to be unfair, the question is really a matter of public policy, not empirical 
reality. That is, whether or not all guilty individuals who agree to a search are in fact 
agreeing due to improper pressure is a question of how we want to view the pressure in 
question, not a question of true free will. 
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of any rights he gave up) may be incarcerate an innocent person. 
The consequences of an unfair search (unfair because the 
individual did not know he could refuse) do not raise the same 
concerns about the truth finding.257 This is not to say that a 
nonautonomous (due to lack of knowledge) waiver of Fourth 
Amendment rights in a consent search does not result in a 
diminution of autonomy for the individual in question. Rather, 
the significance of this loss has been determined by the Court to 
be not great enough to justify imposing disclosure requirements 
on law enforcement personnel seeking to conduct the search.258 
One possible reason is that individual autonomy generally is 
maximized under a system in which law enforcement is able to 
gather evidence through consent searches to use against 
criminals who, by definition, have often infringed upon another’s 
autonomy.259 So, the lessening of autonomy in any particular case 
of an unknowing consent allowing a search is offset by the overall 
benefits to autonomy of individuals generally by assuring the 
most efficient system of law enforcement. 
Although the lack of safeguards in the Fourth Amendment 
context, when compared with the Fifth Amendment context, can 
be explained under an autonomy framework,260 in practice, courts 
appear to conflate the requirements of intention and volition—
using the term “voluntary” rather than “autonomous” to 
encompass both the absence of coercion and the knowledge 
requirements. In a recent Supreme Court decision, United States 
v. Drayton,261 police officers requested permission to search bus 
passengers.262 Although the Court mentioned the knowledge 
                                                          
 257. In the Fifth Amendment situation, there is a genuine concern about eliciting 
false statements (and thus undermining the validity of the judicial process), an issue 
relating to the reliability of evidence that is not present in the consent search setting. See 
Kaplan & Dixon, supra note 2, at 951; Spritzer, supra note 2, at 514; see also Dix, supra 
note 2, at 227 (noting that the Court in Bustamonte perceived Fourth Amendment rights 
as “serving interests other than accuracy of [the] trial outcome”). Professor Dix, however, 
argues that this was incorrect and that “the relevant concern should have been the 
importance of the privacy interests protected by the [F]ourth [A]mendment.” Id. at 228. 
 258. Recall that the baseline in all cases is noninterference. Refer to Part III.C supra. 
It is only when the consequences are great enough that there is a basis for imposing 
additional requirements or safeguards around the waiver process. Thus, there is an 
acceptance in the Fourth Amendment context that some waivers will be unknowing.  
 259. This excludes crimes that have no victims, such as may be argued in some drug 
cases. There is continuing debate about whether such victimless crimes should be 
prosecuted. See 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS 
WRONGDOING xxix (1984). 
 260. There may be other explanations for this difference. 
 261. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
 262. Id. at 200 (holding that it is not a violation of Fourth Amendment protections 
for law enforcement officers to pose questions to, and ask for, consent to search belongings 
of individuals, as long as it would be reasonable for them to believe there was a right to 
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issues, its analysis improperly focused on whether the officers’ 
lack of notification that the passengers could refuse permission 
was so coercive as to prevent a freely given waiver.263 If the issue 
is potential coercion via police misconduct, imposing a warning 
requirement is unlikely to have a significant effect.264 In fact, a 
number of studies imply that individual susceptibility to 
authority is similar in both custodial interrogation (Fifth 
Amendment) and search (Fourth Amendment) situations.265 
However, if the concern is not with the potential for coercion, but 
rather autonomy, there may be less need to assure the autonomy 
of the waiver in the Fourth Amendment context. Therefore 
different standards of knowledge are appropriate. 
Of course this argument assumes that the secondary 
analysis of consequences is driven by law enforcement 
efficiency goals. If one values distributional goals266 over 
efficiency, the disparity between the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment context may be more problematic. If more poor 
and uneducated individuals waive privacy protections, we 
might be more concerned with the consequences of an unfair 
waiver via consent to search, than if the focus is merely on the 
reliability of evidence. An autonomy framework does not 
preclude such an approach. The analysis would be similar, but 
                                                          
refuse). 
 263. Id. at 206–07. This Article is not arguing that it is inappropriate for the Court to 
consider whether the waivers were voluntarily given, only that a warning requirement 
does not really facilitate the voluntariness prong of autonomy. Rather, a warning assures 
the intention prong is met. Although informing a suspect that her refusal to talk will be 
respected may help alleviate some coercion, it is not clear that the warnings effectively 
prevent the perception of coercion, or encourage suspects to remain silent. Because courts 
have flatly refused to consider whether knowledge safeguards should be applied in the 
Fourth Amendment contexts, the result is that they are forced to analyze everything 
under voluntariness, even when it may be more appropriate to focus on intention 
(knowledge). 
 264. Recent years have seen the Court retreat from a robust interpretation of 
Miranda, perhaps acknowledging that even in the Fifth Amendment context, the 
warnings are both of little value in preventing coercion and of minor practical effect in 
assuring knowledge. Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 
126 (1998) (“Although the Justices are unlikely to overrule Miranda in the foreseeable 
future, one can say fairly that the Court has retreated from the holding of Miranda in 
several significant respects.”). Alternatively, it might signal the Court’s tougher stance 
regarding criminals and its dissatisfaction with the expanded scope of Miranda. 
 265. See Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 47 (1974) (describing a study that measured the relative degree of social power 
possessed by uniformed authorities); see also John Sabini & Maury Silver, Dispositional 
vs. Situational Interpretations of Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: “The Fundamental 
Attributional Error,” 13 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 147 (1983) (explaining how subjects in 
Milgram’s experiment exhibited extreme responsiveness to perceived uniformed authority 
figures). 
 266. “Distributional” here refers to equal or just application of protections and rules. 
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would stress that an unfair search and an unfair confession 
are equivalent because the consequences disproportionately 
limit the autonomy of a vulnerable segment of the population. 
Resolution of the debate about which secondary goals to 
pursue is beyond the scope of this Article.  The point here is 
that an autonomy framework functions best in the initial 
analysis, and can accommodate a number of secondary factors 
including efficiency goals, distributional goals, and others. 
2. Contractual Waivers of Statutory Rights. There are 
two types of contractual waivers that will be considered here.  
The first are waivers of contractual conditions that were 
previously created and agreed to by the parties. The second are 
waivers of other rights via contract. With respect to the first 
situation, the label “waiver” is improperly used in many 
contexts.267 Often the term is used to avoid problems with 
characterizing the conduct as a contractual “modification,” 
although “modification” indeed may be more accurate.268 When 
appropriately categorized, for most cases involving the waiver 
of a contractual condition created and agreed to by equal and 
autonomous parties, basic contractual doctrines of reliance and 
fairness will control.269 These doctrines raise concerns about 
“other-regarding” effects of the waiver, and as mentioned at 
the outset, these effects provide an independent basis for 
limiting individual waiver decisions.270 Absent fairness 
concerns, these waivers should be permissible unless the 
condition is for the benefit of both parties (thus unwaivable by 
one alone because there are implications for both parties’ 
autonomy),271 or the condition is a material part of the 
                                                          
 267. See JOHN S. EWART, WAIVER DISTRIBUTED 11 (1917) (describing the misuse of 
the term “waiver” when applied to contracts); John S. Ewart, Professor Williston’s Review 
of Waiver, 11 MINN. L. REV. 415, 415 (1927) (same); Snyder, supra note 8, at 624–28 
(distinguishing the terms “waiver,” “modification,” and “estoppel” in contract law). 
 268. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 8.5, at 374–75 (2d 
ed. 1990) (commenting on why the term “waiver” may be preferable to the term 
“modification” in terms of contract analysis). 
 269. Id. § 8.5, at 377. This is not incompatible with the autonomy framework. 
Essentially, at issue here is whether fully autonomous and equal parties can agree to a 
change in a previously executed autonomous agreement. If both parties agree to the 
change, the answer should be yes. If only one party seeks to change the agreement, it 
should also be allowed, unless the other party has already relied on the agreement and 
such change would be unfair. As noted in the beginning of the Article, one individual’s 
autonomy may be limited to the extent that its exercise infringes upon another 
individual’s autonomy. Refer to notes 32–37 supra and accompanying text. 
 270. Refer to notes 69–75 supra and accompanying text (explaining “other-regarding” 
effects of waiver). 
 271. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 268, § 8.5, at 374 n.6. 
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contract272 (and thus the waiver essentially negates the 
contract).273 
Of more interest for purposes of this Article is the category 
of contractual waivers of rights relating to one party’s autonomy. 
One example is the waiver of ascriptive autonomy in contracts for 
personal services, or contracts involving personal conditions.274 
Limitations on these waivers are discussed under the heading of 
ascriptive autonomy.275 A second example are waivers of 
safeguards that have been put in place to promote descriptive 
autonomy, such as those designed to remedy disparities in 
bargaining power between the parties. Often created as statutory 
requirements, they are designed to grant rights to the weaker 
party in the transaction,276 and therefore genuine questions of 
autonomy are raised when that party seeks to waive the 
protection.277 
                                                          
 272. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 85, at 755. Professor Anderson explains that non-
waivable duties between equal parties “are limited to those which go to the essence of the 
bargain, such as the basic obligation to perform in good faith, or the provision of some 
minimal remedies for breach.” Id. But she clarifies, “[w]here the relative bargaining 
power of the parties is unequal, the extent of non-waivable duties implied by law will be 
much greater.” Id. The latter limitations, according to Professor Anderson, are prompted 
not only by concerns of efficiency, but also with fairness. Id. at 756. But see Kronman, 
supra note 14, at 765 (stating that although limits on contractual freedom may be based 
on efficiency and fairness, they may also be based on ideas of personal integrity and 
notions of sound judgment). The latter two categories coincide with the concepts of 
ascriptive and descriptive autonomy. 
 273. See 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 268, § 8.5, at 379 (“Parties can most easily waive 
conditions that are essentially procedural or technical . . . .”). Conditions that are a 
material part of the contract may be dispensed with by dispensing with the contract 
altogether. However, such action may be a “waiver” and thus permissible under that 
doctrine. 
 274. The latter category is well demonstrated by a case in which an author 
contracted to write a textbook and, in addition, to refrain from drinking during the 
drafting. See Clark v. West, 86 N.E. 1, 3–4 (N.Y. 1908). This would not be a condition of 
which a court could force performance. The author continued to drink, but the court found 
that the contract terms were substantially met, and thus, he was due the appropriate 
royalties. Id. at 3, 5–6. 
 275. Refer to Part II.A. supra (describing ascriptive autonomy). 
 276. Some rules are put in place through state statutes, while others are common 
law rules, and others are codified in the Uniform Commercial Code. For a comparison of 
the attitude toward contractual waivers of statutory protections between the Lochner era 
and the modern Court, see Shell, supra note 17, at 472–74, 477–82. 
 277. See Thomas G. Kelch & Michael K. Slattery, The Mythology of Waivers of 
Bankruptcy Privileges, 31 IND. L. REV. 897, 924 (1998) (noting that “a statutory privilege 
may not be waived when there is a strong public policy for the benefit of the general 
public underpinning the provision”). This Article argues that the issue is better phrased 
as analysis of descriptive autonomy. Thus, statutory protections can be waived if they are 
not ones: for which an autonomous waiver would be impossible, which would be too costly 
to prove, or which would be lacking sufficient autonomy in the waiver to counterbalance 
the protection given up. 
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Consider first contractual waivers of employment rights 
such as waivers of valid litigation claims, or waivers of litigation 
rights by accepting a mandatory arbitration clause.278 For 
example, under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 
(OWBPA), employees can waive claims for age discrimination in 
exchange for severance benefits.279 Among other things, the 
statute requires that waivers be “voluntary and knowing” and 
imposes specific safeguards to assure the two elements are met.280 
These include a disclosure requirement, a waiting period, and a 
rescission period.281 The OWBPA was enacted in part to remedy 
some disparities of bargaining power between employees and 
employers,282 and thus serves to promote descriptive autonomy. 
This is not an area where the right must be applied in all cases, 
or where autonomous waivers are impossible, or too costly to 
analyze. Thus, at issue is whether the waiver in the specific case 
should be considered valid. A court determining the validity of a 
waiver under the OWBPA should first consider the existence of 
improper pressures (constituting coercion) that may render the 
waiver involuntary.283 Second, it should consider the 
consequences of a non-autonomous waiver and weigh them 
against the costs of imposing specific safeguards. In this 
situation, the balance has already been determined legislatively 
because the statute itself has specific requirements that must be 
met for the waiver to be considered valid. Because the 
consequences of a waiver of anti-discrimination claims are 
significant for both the individual in question and for society as a 
whole, which has an interest in minimizing discrimination in 
                                                          
 278. See generally Harper, supra note 4, at 1294–98 (discussing the waiver of specific 
employment rights); Howard, supra note 4, at 269–73 (examining the waiver of statutorily 
guaranteed employment rights); Silverstein, supra note 135, at 484 (introducing the 
principle that a waiver of an employment right must be a “knowing and voluntary” 
waiver); Ware, supra note 128, at 84–85 (describing the surge in the use of arbitration for 
employment disputes and the waiver of litigation rights). 
 279. Silverstein, supra note 135, at 488; see also Wastak v. Lehigh Valley Health 
Network, No. 00-4797, 2002 WL 468709, at *41 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2002) (upholding a 
waiver of an age discrimination claim under the OWBPA as “knowing and voluntary”). 
 280. Silverstein, supra note 135, at 488–90. 
 281. Id. at 489. 
 282. Id. at 488–89; see also Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 962 (1993). 
 283. Professor Silverstein argues that the safeguards are not sufficient and should be 
more stringent. Silverstein, supra note 135, at 493–94. Specifically, she is concerned that 
the safeguards promote knowledge and disregard voluntariness concerns. See id. at 512–
18. This Article has already pointed out the difficulty in putting in place safeguards 
against coercion, agreeing that it is problematic if, as Professor Silverstein argues, the 
courts are assuming voluntariness in all cases as long as the statutory requirements for 
waiver are met. See id. at 525. However, I do not accept her broad definition of coercion. 
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employment,284 the imposition of safeguards is appropriate. The 
secondary focus here reflects both efficiency and distributive 
goals. Allowing individuals to determine whether to waive their 
rights based on personal financial gain presumably results in 
more efficient outcomes than mandating litigation in all cases. 
However, concerns about the distributive (public policy) goals of 
anti-discrimination statutes led legislatures to impose safeguards 
against nonautonomous waivers.285 
Statutory rescission periods for financial contracts provide 
another example.286 The federal Truth in Lending Act requires, in 
any consumer credit transaction in which a creditor will acquire 
a security interest in a person’s principal residence, a mandatory 
three-day rescission period.287 In addition, the creditor is 
obligated to disclose specific information to the consumer.288 In 
almost all cases, the rescission period is not waivable.289 The only 
exception arises when the consumer provides a written 
statement specifically: (1) describing a bona fide personal 
financial emergency, (2) waiving the rescission period, and (3) 
signed by all consumers entitled to the rescission period.290 Once 
again, this statutory protection is designed to facilitate 
descriptive autonomy. Although these are not situations where 
the rule must be applied to all cases to function effectively, or 
where it would be impossible to conceive of an autonomous 
waiver, they are ones where the cost of evaluating each case may 
be so expensive or burdensome that an across-the-board 
determination is made to restrict waivers. The exception in the 
statute indicates a unique situation where an individual’s waiver 
decision would be rational, and would prevent additional harm to 
the individual. However, the safeguards imposed around such 
                                                          
 284. That is, autonomy overall is facilitated under an employment system which 
rewards ability rather than race, gender, age, or any other factor; so, safeguards are 
warranted in this context. 
 285. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-107 (Michie 2002) (voiding any employee’s 
waiver of rights or benefits when the waiver is related to discrimination, obstruction, or 
employee payments that are statutorily prohibited); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-645 (1998) 
(voiding any waiver of rights that allow employers to discriminate in regard to hiring, 
rehiring, or tenure of work); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6A-45 (West 2000) (same). 
 286. See generally Elwin Griffith, Truth in Lending—The Right of Rescission, 
Disclosure of the Finance Charge, and Itemization of the Amount Financed in Closed-End 
Transactions, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 191, 194 (1998). 
 287. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a) (2000); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2002). There are generally 
state analogs to this statute. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.26 (2002) (discussing 
mortgage loan disclosures). 
 288. 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3); Griffith, supra note 286, at 194. 
 289. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3). 
 290. 12 C.F.R. § 226.31. 
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waivers are evidence of the concerns legislatures have with the 
consequences of a potential non-autonomous waiver. 
Both these examples and others in contract law deserve 
more attention than I can afford them within the context of this 
Article. The purpose here is simply to show that an autonomy 
framework can be used both to explain the differing treatment of 
these particular waiver cases and to better understand why 
certain types of safeguards were deemed appropriate. The 
safeguards chosen should be designed to assure the autonomy of 
the waiver, and not merely to serve whatever secondary goal is at 
stake. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Waiver is important in many areas of law, yet there have 
been few efforts to develop a unifying theory to govern it.  This 
Article uses the concept of autonomy both as a descriptive tool to 
explain differences in laws relating to waiver and as a normative 
theory from which to evaluates the appropriateness of waivers in 
different contexts. There are at least two different senses of 
autonomy at issue, and these have different implications for the 
permissibility of waiver. Furthermore, there are system 
constraints here, as in other areas. Although this Article 
attempted to apply the framework to different legal areas, 
experts in the relative fields are better equipped to develop the 
analysis in more detail. 
In all areas of law, waivers are useful and should generally 
be permitted. Respecting individual waivers respects autonomy. 
Limitations on waivers are only appropriate when there are 
either system or autonomy justifications. Where the autonomy 
given up by the waiver is significant, the waiver itself must 
demonstrate a corresponding degree of autonomy to 
counterbalance the loss. Evaluation of the autonomy of the 
waiver entails two elements—voluntariness and intention. 
Evaluation of the autonomy given up as part of the waiver of a 
particular right is more difficult, and requires that courts or 
legislatures consider the justifications for governmental 
interference with individual freedom. As we think about specific 
legal rights and the concepts of autonomy, including how to 
evaluate the consequences of non-autonomous waivers, we should 
gain additional clarification of both when waivers are 
appropriate and the need for particular safeguards around the 
waiver process. 
 
